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INTRODUCTION
The nearly four-year civil war that Bosnia endured from April
1992 to December 1995 resulted in a country ravaged both economi-
cally2 and physically.3 Millions of threatened and persecuted people
1. Interview with twenty-five year old refugee from Prjavor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in Washington, D.C. (June 17, 1998).
2. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF
THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 170-71 (1997) (finding that Bosnia's gross national
product dropped more than two-thirds since 1990, and that industrial production is
now at a level of only twenty percent of its pre-war capacity); see also Elizabeth
M. Cousens, Making Peace Agreement Work: The Implementation and Enforce-
ment of Peace Agreement Between Sovereign and Intermediate Sovereign: Making
Peace in Bosnia Work, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 792 (1997) (stating that nearly
all of Bosnia's economic infrastructure was ruined during the four years of con-
flict).
3. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 792 (finding almost half of the housing in
Bosnia was ruined); see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
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fled their homes in search of peace.' By 1995, one million refugees'
were living outside the Bosnian border and at least another million
were displaced throughout the country.' At war's end, the issue of
refugees and displaced persons became one of the major factors
threatening stability in the region.' Many scholars believe that the
failure to adequately enforce the return of refugees to their homeland
could result in hostilities and possibly ignite the fires of war once
again.9
REFUGEES, supra note 2, at 171 (noting that the military forces damaged Bosnian
land through the use of land mines during hostilities).
4. See John M. Scheib, Comment, Threshold of Lasting Peace: The Bosnian
Property Comnission, Multi-Ethnic Bosnia and Foreign Poliov, 24 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 119, 119 (1997) (noting that Bosnian refugees escaped to prevent
the evils of war and the consequences of their nationality). See generally PETER
MAAS, LOVE THY NEIGHBOR 5, 8, 9, 77, 86 (1996) (recounting various stories of
Bosnian refugees who were forced to flee their homes in the infamous mass proc-
ess euphemistically called "ethnic cleansing"); Letter from the Secretar
" 
General
to the President of the Security Council, Feb. 9. 1993, U.N. SCOR, at 55-56, U.N.
Doc. S/25274 ("Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugosla-
via, "ethnic cleansing" means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using
force to remove persons of given groups from the area.").
5. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
51. "Refugee" is defined according the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, as a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country.
Id.
6. See Internally Displaced Persons, U.N. ESCOR. 51st Sess., Agenda Item
11 (d), para. 116, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/50 (1995) (stating that "[ilntemally dis-
placed person[s]" are defined as "persons who have been forced to flee their homes
suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal
strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and
who are within the territory of their own country").
7. See The Dayton Accords and the Return of Bosnian Ref iigees. The Balkan
Institute, Jan. 29, 1996, available in <http://wwv.balkaninstitute.org/ refer-
ence.Rs5refug.html>.
8. See id. (identifying the return of refugees as one of the greatest obstacles to
stability in Bosnia).
9. See Dayton at Two Years, The Balkan Institute, Jan. 5, 1998, available in
<http://www.balkaninstitute.org/analysis.DaytonReport2-years.html> (suggesting
that the failure to adequately implement civilian provisions, such as the return of
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The Bosnian refugee issue has historical precedent. In fact, Bosnia
can benefit by learning from both positive and negative refugee
models,'" including the Palestinian refugee situation. The Palestinian
refugee situation is often considered "the oldest and largest refugee
problem,"" extending back fifty years'2 and involving over 2.7 mil-
lion Palestinian refugees.'3 The length of the crisis and the lack of a
comprehensive bilateral agreement have allowed the refugee situa-
tion to heighten and intensify, greatly disturbing the peace plan and
causing an increase in nationalism."
Although Bosnia has developed a plan for return, Bosnia must
heed the mistakes made with the Palestinian refugees. The General
Framework Agreement, negotiated in Dayton, Ohio ("Dayton Ac-
cords")," addressed the refugee and displaced person" issue by end-ing the fighting in Bosnia and enacting a plan for reconstruction."
refugees, could result in prolonged fighting); see also Cousens, supra note 2, at
801 (noting that a failure to implement the refugee return plan could result in war).
But see Charles G. Boyd, Making Bosnia Work, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1988,
at 42, 47-48 (1998) (explaining the view that the hatred must subside before refu-
gees from ethnic minorities will return).
10. See DONNA E. ARZT, REFUGEES INTO CITIZENS: PALESTINIANS AND TIlE
END OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 101 (explaining how nations such as South
Africa or the new Balkan states can benefit from learning about the refugee return
from countries who previously experienced this transformation).
II Id. (defining the Palestinian refugee situation as the "longest standing in
modern history"); see also Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Pales-
tinian Refugees: Fifty Years of Injustice (visited July 12, 1998)
<http://nmopic.pna.net/un-pal-1948.htm> (stating that the Palestinian refugee
problem is five decades old and has been at issue since the creation of the United
Nations).
12. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text (noting the longevity of the
Palestinian refugee problem and the countries with the highest concentrations of
Palestinian refugees).
13. See ARZT, supra note 10, at 101.
14. See infra notes 243-88 and accompanying text (detailing how the lack of a
comprehensive plan and the length of the refugee crisis in Israel has led to in-
creased nationalism and effected a peace settlement).
15. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec.
14, 1995, Bosn.-Herz., 35 I.L.M. 75 [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
16. See id. Annex 7,35 I.L.M. at 136-41.
17. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
170 (stating that the Dayton Peace Accords ended the conflict in Bosnia).
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The ultimate goal of the Dayton Accords was to maintain peace and
to reestablish a multi-ethnic state.'" The return of refugees and dis-
placed persons to their original homes is imperative to reach this
goal.' 9 Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords? provides a plan to facilitate
this refugee return.2'
Although the Dayton Accords have produced some initial suc-
cesses, including the return of about 350,000 refugees and displaced
persons, more than 1.5 million people remain displaced within Bos-
nia and outside the borders. 2 In addition, of those 350,000 refugees
that returned, only 30,000 returned to areas where they belong to the
ethnic minority. 3 The Property Commission, a legal implementation
body organized under Annex 7,24 has resolved six thousand property
claims. 25 Hundreds of thousands of refugees, however, continue to
18. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 232 (1998) (stating that the
peacemakers' two goals were to extend the sixty day cease-fire and to create a
multi-ethnic state). But see Boyd, supra note 9, at 43 (noting the hypocrisy of the
Dayton Accords in its attempts to recreate a multi-ethnic state "where no common
sense of national community existed.").
19. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
170 (identifying that the return of refugees as intended to reverse the progress of
ethnic cleansing and to recreate a multi-ethnic state); see also UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: INFORMATION NOTES. at i, No. i 98 (Jan.-
Feb. 1998) [hereinafter INFORMATION NOTES-No. 1/981 (declaring that the return
of refugees, especially minority returns, is a priority in 1998).
20. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15. Annex 7. 35 i.L.1M. at 136-41.
21. See id.
22. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (providing an executive summary
of some of the successes and flaws of the Dayton Accord).
23. See id. at I (stating that of the 350,000 refugees and displaced persons, only
30,000 have gone back to regions deemed "ethnically hostile"); see also Boyd, su-
pra note 9, at 48 (noting that those who came back to live as minorities in another
enthic group's area are heavily outnumbered by those who have fled Dayton's
freshly drawn boundaries, which left them as new minorities).
24. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7. 35 I.L.M. at 136-41 (de-
fining the Commission as an adjudicatory body having jurisdiction over property
claims to decide issues of ownership and just value of the land).
25. See RRTF: Report for March 1998, Office of High Representative, Sara-
jevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mar. 1998, available in <http://www.ohr.int> (noting
that due to the Commission's limited financial means and the large number of
claims, only 6,000 claims out of 70,000 were processed as of December 1997).
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wait for their claims to be addressed.26 The need to resolve these
property issues is imperative and must be completed without further
delay.27
Annex 7 specifically grants refugees the right to return to their
homes, 28 as do numerous other documents. For example, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights 9 and the Human Commission on
Human Rights ° reaffirm a person's right to voluntarily return to her
country of origin." Given that the refugees have an inherent right of
return, the question remains: what is preventing them from returning
and what are the ramifications if their return is not adequately im-
plemented? Why is the plan for refugee return established in Annex
7 of the Dayton Accords not working?
This Comment examines how the failure to implement Annex 7 of
the Dayton Accords, concerning refugee return and property reacqui-
sition, affects the stability of Bosnia as well as the recreation of a
multi-ethnic state. Part I provides a short history of the fall of Yugo-
slavia and the birth of the state of Bosnia. Part II analyzes the pur-
pose and need for Annex 7. This section recognizes the inherent
flaws in Annex 7 and the reasons for its inadequate enforcement. Part
III explains Bosnia's current method of enforcement, detailing the
roles of the United Nations and local governments. Part IV compares
26. See id.
27. See Scheib, supra note 4, at 120 (noting the pressing problems presented by
the property claims of refugees).
28. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 136-41 ("All
refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of ori-
gin.").
29. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (1948).
30. See Economic and Social Council Resolution, U.N. 1 988, (LIV) of May
18, 1973) [hereinafter Human Commission].
31. See id. (reaffirming "the fundamental right of refugees and internally dis-
placed persons to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to their country of origin
and/or within it to their place of origin or choice" and Article 5(d)(ii) of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and
the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one's own country
contained in Article 12, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights."); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
29, art. 13, para. 2 (noting "the right of every person to return to his or her own
country.").
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the refugee situation in Bosnia to that in Israel with the Palestinian
refugees. This section examines possible lessons the international
community should have learned from the Palestinian experience and
suggests how the community should apply these lessons in Bosnia.
Finally, this Comment concludes with recommendations for imple-
mentation and enforcement of Annex 7, in order to reach the ultimate
goal of a stable, multi-ethnic Bosnia.
I. SHORT HISTORY OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of six republics in the former Yugo-
slavia.2 With a prewar population in 1991 of 43.7% Muslim, 31.4%
Serb, 17.3% Croat, and 5.5% Yugoslav, Bosnia was the most ethni-
cally mixed republic.3 Josip Broz ("Tito") and his administration
managed to suppress ethnic tensions among the groups during his
years in power in Yugoslavia." Many citizens, however, still feared
the thought of multi-ethnic conflict." Many Bosnians remember this
prewar era as a time when they were Yugoslavians first and Serbian,
Muslim, or Croatian second.36 The people spoke the same language,
worked together, and frequently intermarried.'"
32. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 790 n.3 (stating that the Yugoslav state was
comprised of six republics: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Mon-
tenegro, and Macedonia).
33. See LEONARD J. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: YUGOSL,\IA'S DISINTEGRATION
AND BALKAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION 241 (1995) (describing the ethnic make-up
of Bosnia).
34. See id. at 22 (describing Croatian communist dictator Tito's rise to power
in 1937 and his vision of a unified Yugoslav state).
35. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 245 (noting that although ethnic tensions
were suppressed during the authoritarian communist reign, the situation remained
ripe for war).
36. See Interview with twenty-five year old refugee from Prnjavor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, supra note 1 (recalling his childhood during Tito's reign when the
communist mentality, as well as the attitude of the people, prevented nationalism
from erupting into violence).
37. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 27 (stating that 18.6% of marriages between
1981 and 1991 were between people of different nationalities); cf ROBERT D.
KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY 25 (1995) (quoting
British expert Nevill Forbes who asserted in his 1915 study of the Balkans that
Serbs and Croats originated from one people, suggesting were it not for religion,
there would be a minimal basis for ethnic tensions).
1998]
AM. U. INT' L. REv.
With the death of Tito in 1980, the situation in Yugoslavia slowly
transformed from a republic comprised of ethnically mixed and har-
monized people into a republic in which ethnic identities were more
pronounced." As early as 1987, nationalist leaders began igniting
ethnic tensions to further their political goals.39 One of these nation-
alist leaders, Slobodan Milosevic, began his rise to power in Serbia,
the largest Yugoslavian republic, 40 where he espoused nationalistic
sentiments that eventually spread throughout the other republics.
4
'
In June of 1991, the region underwent drastic change when Slove-
nia,42 the smallest republic in Yugoslavia, declared its independ-
ence.4 A short war followed,4 though, for various reasons, the resis-
tance by the Yugoslavian National Army was minimalY A short time
38. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 26 (suggesting that the disintegration of Yugo-
slavia began when President Tito died in 1980).
39. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 26 (explaining how Yugoslavia's political
transformation in 1980 from a one-person presidency to a rotating presidency, its
economic downfall, and its repudiation of old ideas led to a resurgence of nation-
alism).
40. See id. (noting that Milosevic spoke in Serbia in 1987, urging the Serbian
people to assert and protect their rights).
41. See id. (noting a resurgence of nationalism following Milosevic's speech in
Kosovo); see also KAPLAN, supra note 37, at 39 (stating that the spread of the Ser-
bian revolution against Yugoslavia began in 1987 when Milosovic came to Kosovo
Polje). Milosevic stated, "They'll [Albanians?] never do this to you again. Never
again will anyone defeat you." Id.
42. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 27 (noting that Slovenia and Croatia's relative
homogeneity enabled it to attain its independence from the rest of the former
Yugoslavia with little bloodshed).
43. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 227 (noting that Slovenia's decision to de-
clare its independence at the end of June 1991 began a new era for Yugoslavia);
see also MAAS, supra note 4, at 27 (suggesting Slovenia's independence was a
prelude to war in Bosnia).
44. See COHEN, sutpra note 33, at 227-28 (stating that the war in Slovenia
lasted only ten days and resulted in approximately fifty people killed and some
three hundred wounded).
45. See id. at 229 (suggesting that the minimal involvement of the Yugoslavian
National Army in Slovenia was due to its preoccupation with Croatia, which also
sought independence, and the relatively small Serbian population in Slovenia); see
also MAAS, supra note 4, at 27 (claiming that the Serbians did not put forth much
resistance against Slovenian independence because of the small Serbian population
in Slovenia).
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later, Croatia, 6 another republic with a significant Serbian population
of 600,000, 47 declared independence." Unlike the fighting in Slove-
nia, a more intense war began with the Yugoslavian National Army
trying to protect Yugoslavia, the state, as well as the significant Ser-
bian population that lived in Croatia.!" By January 1992, the fighting
in Slovenia and Croatia subsided, and the European Community and
United Nations officially recognized Slovenian and Croatian inde-
pendence."
The situation was now ripe for a transformation in Bosnia.'2 In
April 1992, the European Community recognized Bosnia's inde-
pendence. 3 Shortly thereafter the United States followed suit, " be-
lieving that the European Community and United Nations' recogni-
tion of independence in Slovenia and Croatia prevented further
bloodshed." Unfortunately, the optimism of the international com-
46. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 790 n.3. Croatia was one of the six republics
in the former Yugoslavia. See id.
47. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 27.
48. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 229 (noting that Croatia declared independ-
ence on June 25, 199 1).
49. See id. (describing the war in Croatia as very destructive, resulting in over
10,000 people killed, about 30,000 wounded, and the "dislocation of hundreds of
thousands of people").
50. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 27 (suggesting that the Yugoslavian involve-
ment in Croatia was due to the Serbians' fear that an independent Croatia would
pose a threat to the substantial Serbian population in Croatia).
51. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 240 (stating that although the fighting had
subsided by the time the European Community formally recognized Slovenia and
Croatian as independent states, violence in the former Yugoslavia was far from
over).
52. See id. at 240-41.
53. See id. at 245 (noting that the European Community's recognition of Bos-
nian independence seemed especially threatening to Yugoslavia because it marked
the anniversary of the day the Germans bombed Belgrade).
54. See id.
55. See id. The United States recognized Bosnian independence for two main
reasons. First, it erroneously believed that such recognition would prevent exten-
sive war, as appeared to be the case when the European Union and United Nations
recognized independence in Croatia and Slovenia. See id. Second, it wanted to re-
fute accusations that it was dedicated to a unified Yugoslavia. See id.
1998]
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munity proved to be misplaced, and one of the bloodiest and most
destructive wars in recent history ensued.56
The war in Bosnia was fought mainly between the people who
wanted independence and those who feared that independence meant
the possible subrogation of their ethnicity.57 The Bosnian Serbs,
aided by Yugoslavia, fought to remain a part of Yugoslavia. " The
Bosnian Croats, with support from Croatia, also sought to protect
their interests in the country and advance their desire for more land59
After nearly four years of fighting, the leaders of the Serbian,
Croatian, and Bosniac ° parties gathered together in Dayton, Ohio to
negotiate an end to the war.61 The negotiations produced the Dayton
Accords and provided an end to the fighting and a plan for recon-
struction. Although the country would be considered nominally one
state, it would consist of two entities: the Republika Srpska and the
Federation of Bosnia.62 The creation of these separately controlled
56. See Cousens, supi-a note 2, at 792 (noting the evils that resulted from the
war, including a toll of dead and missing of 279,000 people, or about seven percent
of the population before the war).
57. See MAAS, supra note 4, at 27 (stating that the fear of Bosnian independ-
ence stemmed from Serbian fear of persecution as in the case of Croatian inde-
pendence).
58. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 791 (detailing the Bosnian Serb plan whereby
they would "ethnically cleanse" the region, declare an independent republic, and
then eventually join Serbia proper); see also COHEN, supra note 33, at 247-48 (de-
scribing the close relationship between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs).
59. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 790-91 (explaining the ties between the Bos-
nian Croats and Croatia); see also COHEN, supra note 33, at 248-49 (defining
Croatia's role in relation to the Bosnian Croats during the Bosnian war).
60. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 791 n.5. Increasingly, 'Bosniac' is used to
refer to non-Serb and non-Croat Bosnians, replacing the designation 'Muslim' with
a term marginally less exclusive. See id.
61. See generally HOLBROOKE, supra note 18, at 231-312 (detailing the
twenty-one day international negotiations in Dayton, Ohio between the three war-
ring parties). Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, represented the Bosnian
Serbs. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats. See id.
Alija Izetbegovic represented the Bosniacs.
62. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, cl. 3, 35 I.L.M. at
117-28 (delineating the boundaries between Republika Srpska and Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina); see also Cousens, supra note 2, at 797 (explaining Bos-
nia and its two entities). The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is made up of
Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats while Republika Srpska is home to Bosnian Serbs.
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regions divided Bosnia into two distinct areas, each under the control
of a specific ethnic group, with relatively few inhabitants from ethnic
minorities.63 The apperception of these regions accentuates the need
for the return of refugees if Bosnia is to become the multi-ethnic
state it once was.6
II. ANNEX 7
Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords is the necessary tool to facilitate
the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their origi-
nal homes." First, it provides a comprehensive plan for the return of
refugees.66 Second, it addresses property reacquisition and creates a
commission to monitor and adjudicate these cases.
A. THE PROVISIONS OF ANNEX 7
The plan for refugee return established by Annex 7, agreed to by
both the Federation of Bosnia and Republika Srpska, reiterates the
need for cooperation among the territories to create a suitable atmos-
See id.
63. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: INFORMATION
NOTES, at 9, No. 2/98 (Mar.-Apr. 1998) [hereinafter INFORMATION NOTES-No.
2/98] (describing the two different areas and noting how few refugees have re-
turned to a part of the country where they would represent an ethnic minority).
64. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, cl. 1. 35 I.L.M. at
137 ("The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective
of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina."); see also Minori, Re-
turn or Mass Relocation, International Crisis Group, May 14, 1998, available in
<http://vww.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/bosnia/reports'bh33main.htm> (explain-
ing how many nationalist hard-liners want the refugees to relocate to an area where
they are the majority).
65. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. I, cl. 1, 35 I.L.M. at
137 (asserting that the early return of refugees and displaced persons is an impor-
tant objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina); see also
The Dayton Accords and the Return of Bosnian Refuigees, supra note 7 (explaining
the goal of the Dayton Accords in reference to refugee and displaced persons).
66. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 137-41; see
also The Dayton Accords and the Return of Bosnian Refigees, supra note 7 (de-
tailing the agreement on refugees and displaced persons).
67. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. VII, 35 I.L.M. at 138
(establishing the Property Commission), see Scheib, supra note 4, at 120 (provid-
ing a detailed description of the Property Commission).
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phere for repatriation. 68 Refugees and displaced persons must be able
to return to their homes, free from harassment or discrimination."'
Article I, Clause 3 of Annex 7 identifies the repeal of discriminatory
legislation, the use of unbiased media, and the enactment of eco-
nomic measures as necessary methods to secure the return of refu-
gees.7° Annex 7 also recognizes the role that international organiza-
tions, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("U.N.H.C.R."),7 ' the United Nations Development Programme
("U.N.D.P."), 72 and the International Committee of the Red Cross
("I.C.R.C.") '3 must play in the repatriation of refugees.74
68. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, cl. 3, 35 I.L.M. at
137 ("The Parties shall take all necessary steps to prevent activities within their
territories which would hinder or impede the safe and voluntary return of refugees
and displaced persons.").
69. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. I, cl. 2, 35 I.L.M. at
137 ("The Parties shall ensure that refugees and displaced persons are permitted to
return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution or discrimi-
nation, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or political
opinion."); see also Boyd, supra note 9, at 48 (stressing that the hatred from the
war must cease before there can be unification of the nationalities in Bosnia).
70. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. I, cl. 3, 35 I.L.M. at
137 (declaring that the parties shall repeal discriminatory legislation, prevent in-
sightful propaganda in the media and other outlets, use the media to curb acts of
retribution, protect ethnic minorities, and bring actions against officials who are
responsible for acts against minority groups).
71. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
2 (stating the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for
the protection of about twenty-two million people throughout the world, "with
around thirteen million of whom are refugees in the conventional sense of the
word").
72. See id. at 165-66 (stating the United Nations Development Programme is
responsible for the development of countries throughout the world, focusing on
long-term development issues).
73. The International Committee of the Red Cross is an international organiza-
tion dedicated to the assistance of people in need. The International Committee of
the Red Cross helps assist with activities for people deprived of freedom, protec-
tion of the civilian population, restoration of family links, assistance to "direct and
indirect victims of armed conflict and other violent situations," development of re-
spect for international humanitarian law, and the dissemination and the promotion
of international humanitarian law. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 5-14 (1996).
74. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. IV, 35 I.L.M. at 138
(explaining repatriation assistance). But see The Dayton Accords and the Return of
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In addition, Annex 7 establishes a Commission of nine members
who have jurisdiction over claims concerning property reacquisi-
tion.7 The Commission's decisions are binding over the parties and
recognized as law throughout Bosnia. " When deciding these claims,
the Commission will refuse to recognize any transfer of property that
was made under duress.
B. PURPOSES OF ANNEX 7
Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords serves many purposes for both the
international and Bosnian communities. " First, the adoption of An-
nex 7 by the parties creates a direct legal connection between the
parties and their corresponding duty to facilitate the return of refu-
gees.79 Pursuant to this provision, the parties accept responsibility for
the return of refugees and all the ensuing consequences." Their
commitment to this goal goes beyond mere compliance with such
Bosnian Refugees, supra note 7 (acknowledging the role that the U.N.H.C.R. and
other relevant organizations must play in the return of refugees, but emphasizing
that the "primary responsibility" falls on the Bosnian government, the Federation
of Bosnia, and the Republika Srpska).
75. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. IX, 35 I.L.M. at 139
(noting that the nine members must be appointed within ninety days after the
Agreement enters into force); see also Scheib, supra note 4, at 122 (identifying the
members of the Commission as Professor Maris Riat Saulle, Chairperson; Mr. Da-
vor Cordas; Mr. Miroslav Giadana; Professor Hans van Houtte; Mr. Jean-Pierre
Hocke; Mr. Jasmin Jahjaefendic; Mr. Damir Ljubic; Mr. Mirsad Milavic; and Mr.
Jovo Miskin).
76. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7. art. XII, cl. 7. 35 I.L.M at
140 (explaining that any action of the Commission be recognized as lawful
throughout Bosnia).
77. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. XII, cl. 3, 35 I.L.M. at
140 ("In determining the lawful owner of any property, the Commission shall not
recognize as valid any illegal property transaction, including any transfer that was
made under duress, in exchange for exit permission or documents, or that was oth-
erwise in connection with ethnic cleansing.").
78. See STEPHEN W. WALKER, PARTITION BOSNIA? NOT AN OPTION (1997),
available in <http://\v-wv. balkaninstitute.org/opinion/op-ed-sw-12897.htm> (rec-
ognizing that both the United States and Bosnian policies should make the imple-
mentation of Annex 7 a priority to create a stable environment).
79. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, 35 I.L.M. at 89 (noting that the par-
ties have accepted the provisions of Annex 7 by signing the Dayton Agreement).
80. See id. (noting the parties' legal obligation to fulfill their commitments un-
der the various annexes).
1998]
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' The par-
ties themselves drafted and agreed to the provisions of the Dayton
Accords, as a whole, and Annex 7 in particular.82 They must comply
with the provisions of this agreement.83
Second, as noted above,14 Annex 7 provides an extensive plan for
the reacquisition of property by the refugees. 5 This is an important
provision because refugees will have more incentive to return if they
know that the government will return their land.86 Annex 7 provides
for the enforcement of land reacquisition through the establishment
of the Property Commission.' The Property Commission has the
81. See Alfred de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and
the hIternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L.F. 257,
267 (asserting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, secures a refi-
gee's right to return to her country); see also Justice R. Weiner, The Palestinian
Refugees' "Right to Return" and the Peace Process, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 42-43 (explaining that resolutions from the General Assembly of the
United Nations are not necessarily binding).
82. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. XVIII, 35 I.L.M. at
141 (binding the parties to the agreement and enacting the provisions). But see de
Zayas, supra note 81, at 267 (claiming that "frequent invocation [of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights] by the General Assembly through the years lends
further support to the declaration's status as a binding instrument.").
83. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. XIII, 35 I.L.M at 140
(explaining the entry into force of the agreement and all provisions).
84. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing property reacquisi-
tion).
85. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. I, cl. 1, 35 I.L.M. at
137 ("They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they
were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any
property that cannot be restored to them."); see also id. Annex 7, arts. VII-XVIII at
35 I.L.M. 138-41 (developing the Property Commission and identifying its man-
dates, including deciding property claims in Bosnia-Herzegovina). But see Scheib,
supra note 4, at 130 (noting that Annex 7 lacks a specific implementation force).
86. See U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 112(c), at 8, U.N. Doc.
A/52/490 (1997) (stating that property reacquisition is vital to achieving successful
refugee returns); see also RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (noting
that settling property claims and establishing a country-wide real estate market
could result in the opening of apartments, allowing the original owners to return).
87. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. VII-XIII, 35 I.L.M. at
138-40 (stating that the Commission shall decide property claims in Bosnia); see
also Scheib, supra note 4, at 121 (explaining that to encourage refugees to return to
their homes, the Dayton Accords included the creation of a neutral dispute resolu-
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power to develop and apply the law concerning property claims.'"
The parties will be bound by these decisions."
Third, Annex 7 isolates methods to facilitate the return of refu-
gees." Annex 7 suggests methods to create a safe atmosphere for the
return of refugees, including the enforcement of fair legislation and
fair media coverage.9' Moreover, these proposals suggest a reforma-
tion of the political systems to ensure a free society rather than a na-
tionalist state.92 This is important for both Bosnia and the interna-
tional community, including, but not limited to the United States,
Croatia, and Yugoslavia.9
tion body, the Property Commission).
88. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15. Annex 7, art.Vll-XIII, 35 I.L.M. at
138-40.
89. See id. Annex 7, art. VIII, 35 I.L.M. at 139 ("The parties shall cooperate
with the work of the Commission, and shall respect and implement its decisions
expeditiously and in good faith, in cooperation with relevant international and
nongovernmental organizations having responsibility for the return and reintegra-
tion of refugees and displaced persons.").
90. See id. Annex 7, art. II, 35 I.L.M. at 138 (suggesting various ways to fa-
cilitate the return of refugees and implement more democratic methods to develop
fair societies for return); cf Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self Sustaining Strtc-
tures, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 10,
1997, available in <http://wxww.ohr.int:8/docu/d971210a.htm> [hereinafter Sef-
Sustaining Structures] (identifying other factors that must be addressed to facilitate
the return of refugees including removing such hindrances as: "the levying of so-
called war taxes; failure to establish a system of access to personal documents; ex-
isting registration processes; uncertainty concerning applicable customs regula-
tions and tariffs; deficiencies in the allocation of temporary housing, and the low
capacity of administrative organs.").
91. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, cl. 3, 35 I.L.M. at
137 (defining certain steps to build confidence in the regions and expedite the re-
turn process); cf RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (identifying the
weaknesses that exist in the political institutions, lack of security, and hostile envi-
ronment as factors impeding a conducive environment for the return of refugees).
92. See generally Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 12-13
(suggesting that the securing of a safe atmosphere and the return of refugees, espe-
cially those belonging to minorities, could prevent nationalist leaders from ree-
merging in Bosnia).
93. See Hearings on the Inplementation of the Dayton Peace 4ccords Before
the Senate Armed Services Commn., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Special Representative of the President and the
Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords) (acknowl-
edging that one of the goals of Dayton and the international community is the im-
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the strict enforcement of
Annex 7 could reestablish a multi-ethnic Bosnia.9 If Annex 7 is fully
implemented, refugees will be able to return95 to areas where they are
in the minority. 6 The safe reintroduction of minority groups would
likely result in a multi-ethnic state. 97
C. FATAL FLAWS IN ANNEX 7
Annex 7 is extraordinary in the sense that a proper, specific im-
plementation would result in the rebirth of a multi-ethnic state. This
provision, however, is wrought with numerous difficulties, including
problems associated with relocation, lack of military presence, lack
of a specific timeline, too much power in the parties' hands, and a
contradiction between Annex 7 and other provisions within the
Dayton Accords. These problems have been exacerbated in the cur-
rent situation and could result in a permanent partitioned state with
no possibility of complete unification. 8
plementation of democratic processes in Bosnia); see also Boyd, supra note 9, at
44 (noting that after the considerable expense in terms of troops, time, and money
the United States has put into Bosnia, the failure to establish a multi-ethnic state
would not only be embarrassing for the United States, but also detrimental eco-
nomically for the Bosniac and Bosnian Serb regions). See generallv COHEN, supra
note 33, at 51-55, 241-50 (identifying the vocal nationalism that emerged after Tito
and noting how this eventually evolved into war).
94. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 801 (observing that the successful imple-
mentation of Annex 7 could result in an almost complete reversal of the war's ef-
fects on the ethnic make-up of the region); see also UNITED NATIONS HIGHI
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at 170 (detailing U.N.H.C.R.'s poli-
cies that support minority returns).
95. See WALKER, supra note 78, at 1 (noting that most Bosnians want to return
to their homes, as seen in the recent elections, in which 89% of voters, whether
voting in person or through absentee ballot, voted in their place of original resi-
dence).
96. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 137
(explaining that all refugees and displaced persons have "the right freely to return
to their homes," without mentioning any limitations for ethnic returns).
97. See HOLBROOKE, supra note 18, at 232 (noting that a primary goal of the
Dayton Accords is the creation of a multi-ethnic state).
98. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 817-18 (analyzing the issue of partition in
Bosnia, focusing on the Bosnian people's actual desires).
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1. Relocation
Article I, Clause 4 of Annex 7 states that the choice of return des-
tination is up to the refugee individual or family.' According to this
provision, the parties should not interfere with the decision of the
refugees." A proper implementation of this provision would enable
refugees and displaced persons to return to their original homes, and
in effect, recreate a multi-ethnic state.'"
The drafters of the Dayton Agreement, however, failed to consider
the consequences of a failure to properly implement this provision of
Annex 7. They did not consider what would happen if relocation"' or
coerced decision-making replaced the original provision, which pro-
vided for free choice by the refugees."" The acquiescence to reloca-
tion is a major flaw of Annex 7 because relocation is a dangerous
proposition for Bosnia.' In addition, it is not the refugees' desire to
relocate. Relocation is simply another demonstration of the national-
ists' dangerous presence and their blatant noncompliance with Arti-
cle I, Clause 4 of Annex 7."5
99. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7. art. I, cl. 4, 35 I.L.M. at
137 ("Choice of destination shall be up to the individual or family, and the princi-
ple of the unity of the family shall be preserved.").
100. See id. ("The Parties shall not interfere with the returnees' choice of desti-
nation, nor shall they compel them to remain in or move to situations of serious
danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking in the basic infrastructure necessary to re-
sume a normal life.").
101. See id.
102. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 13 (defining
three forms of relocation). "Voluntary relocation" is relocation after the sale or ex-
change of property by consent. See id. "Passive relocation" refers to internal dis-
placement that is not based on free will. See id. "Hostile relocation" refers to the
deliberate placement of groups of people in housing belonging to other ethnic
groups, in order to secure control over territory and prevent minorities from re-
turning. See id.
103. See Self-Sustaining Structures, supra note 90 (explaining that the Council
of Europe finds it unacceptable that because of obstacles in implementation, refu-
gees and displaced persons are being relocated to areas other than their original
homes).
104. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 12-13 (articu-
lating reasons the Council of Europe disfavors relocation as an option).
105. See id. at 14-16 (describing the nationalists' use of relocation to further
their goals).
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a. Nationalistic Goals
Many nationalist leaders often promote relocation, a legal option
under the Dayton Accords, to separate and consolidate the ethnic mi-
norities." Although Article I, Clause 4 of Annex 7107 stresses that the
parties cannot interfere with a refugee's decision, hard-liners either
ignore this clause or use more subtle techniques, such as employing
the media propaganda, to encourage relocation.'O° For example, the
Croatian Nationalist Party, HDZ,'0° distributed information to Croa-
tians in Germany encouraging them to return to Bosnian-Croat con-
trolled territories." ° Frequently these tactics are difficult to identify,
and therefore difficult to reprimand. This makes the distinction be-
tween "voluntary" and "forced relocation" difficult to delineate."'
106. See id. at 14-15 (describing how the nationalist leaders of such parties as
the HDZ and the Serb Radical Party use Article 1, Clause 4 of Annex 7 to encour-
age relocation and ultimately consolidate their ethnic group in a certain area).
107. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, cl. 4, 35 I.L.M. at
137 (explaining that the parties must provide information concerning the refugee
or displaced person's choice of return and cannot interfere with this decision).
108. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 15 (detailing
some of the methods used by hard-line parties either to encourage refugees to re-
turn to an area where they would be in the majority or to discourage minority eth-
nic refugees from returning to specific areas); see also Report on the Human
Rights Situation in the Federation Central Bosnia Municipalities with a Special
Emphasis on the Situation of Minority Groups (last modified June 2, 1998)
<http://www.bihfedomb.org/eng-repo/rep97.htm> [hereinafter Report on the Hu-
man Rights Situation in Bosnia] (noting how the local media incite suspicion and
concern about minority groups). Nationalists often use reciprocity to press for relo-
cation of minorities, explaining, for example, that if refugees of their nationality
are not allowed to return to their original homes, they will not allow minority refu-
gees to return to their homes in the area controlled by the nationalists. See id.
109. HDZ stands for the Croatian Democratic Union, one of the three major na-
tionalistic parties in Bosnia. It is the Bosnian branch of Croatia's HDZ. See Daniel
J. Blessington, From Dayton to Sarajevo: Enforcing Election Law in Post War
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 553, 560 (1998).
110. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 15.
111. See id. at 13 (noting that the distinction between "voluntary" and "forced"
is difficult, though "voluntary" relocation is only verifiable where refugees have
the option to return to their original homes but choose not to).
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b. Effects on Housing
Relocation also results in an increased and more complex housing
problem."2 Refugees, intimidated by the dangerous surroundings or
influenced by propaganda, are forced to relocate to another area in
Bosnia."3 Because the refugees occupy this other dwelling, they pre-
vent the original home-owner from returning." ' The original home-
owner, therefore, must relocate, compounding the housing shortage
and further segregating the people."" As previously noted, not only
do most people want to return to their original homes, most people
also desire a reunited rather than segregated Bosnia."'
2. Lack of Milita3, Presence
Annex 7 also fails to utilize a military force to implement the pro-
vision and encourage the return of refugees. Although the return of
refugees is for the most part a civilian matter, it does involve military
issues, including the securing of a safe atmosphere for return."' The
military, however, is hesitant to intrude upon domestic issues and ju-
risdiction."' To date, the lack of military presence has led to numer-
112. See id. at 12 (explaining that relocation prevents the refugees and displaced
persons who wish to return to their homes from doing so, because their houses are
occupied by "relocatees").
113. See supra notes 107-I 1 (explaining how hard-liners use propaganda to en-
courage the relocation of refugees to areas politically convenient).
114. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation. supra note 64, at 12.
115. See id. (examining how relocation negatively affects the housing stock in
Bosnia); see also Telephone Interview with sixty-five year old refugee from Prnja-
vor, Bosnia-Herzegovina (June 17, 1998) (expressing her dream to return to her
home city in Bosnia, but explaining that she would most likely have to relocate to
another city because someone else is currently occupying her property).
116. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining how the majority of
refugees voted in their original residence, reiterating their desire to return to their
homes).
117. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 807-08 (identifying numerous situations
where the return of refugees changed from a civilian matter into a military matter
after violence erupted).
118. See id. at 812 (explaining how NATO does not want to intrude on purely
domestic issues, yet noting that third party implementation already interferes with
domestic jurisdiction).
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ous incidents of violence in such cities as Teslic," 9 Drvar,'2 ° and in
the Kakanj municipality.' These incidents demonstrate the need for
a strong military presence."'
Individuals2 and even civilian forces 24 in both the Republika
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia have resisted minority returns
through violent means.'2 5 Annex 7 provides no means to punish these
individuals or the parties.' In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO")'27 forces decided that refugee return was not
its concern or responsibility. NATO took this position even though it
is the main implementing force for civilian operations in Bosnia.2
119. See id. at 807 (stating that hundreds of Bosniacs were forced to flee Teslic
due to a series of verbal threats, bombings, and beatings); Telephone Interview
with Amir Hanic, Refugee from Teslic, Bosnia-Herzegovina (June 13, 1998) (de-
tailing the intimidation and threats he received before fleeing Teslic).
120. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 807 (explaining how Bosnian Croat individu-
als blocked 250 Bosnian Serbs from visiting their homes in Drvar). But see This
Week in Bosnia (visited June 12, 1998) <http://world.std.com/-slmlastweek.html>
(noting the recent successes in Drvar, including the return of 150 Bosnian Serb
families).
121. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108, at 5
(stating that no Bosnian Croat refugees have been able to return due to fear and in-
timidation within the Kakanj municipality).
122. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 807 (noting that there was reason to include a
military presence in Annex 7).
123. See id. (examining numerous situations where individuals in different areas
throughout Bosnia prevented the return of refugees or affected the stability for re-
turn). See generally Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note
108 (detailing numerous incidents of problems with minority returns).
124. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 808-09 (describing incidents in which local
authorities used intimidation, threats, or physical action to prevent minority refu-
gees from returning). In West Mostar, Bosnian Croat police fired into a crowd of
Bosniacs attempting to visit graves on a Muslim holiday. See id. In other cases, the
police have failed to provide protection for returning refugees. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 137-41. An-
nex 7 does not provide for implementation through military force. See id. Rather
the signatures of the parties are relied on for enforcement. See id. art. XVIII. 35
I.L.M. at 141.
127. See id. NATO is the main implementing force for civilian operations in
Bosnia. See id.
128. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 807 (noting that NATO decided that secur-
ing conditions for refugee returns was not within their obligations).
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Although nation-building is not normally the responsibility of the
military, a strong military presence could prevent violence and help
secure a safe atmosphere for returning refugees. M
3. Lack of Specific Timeline
Annex 7 provides no timeline for the enactment of its provisions,
including the return of the refugees." Although the designated inter-
national organizations have set some goals, little progress or success
has occurred, especially in the area of minority returns." Annex 7
includes a list of items that must be accomplished, including the re-
peal of discriminatory legislation, "the prevention and prompt sup-
pression of written or verbal incitement,'"" and the prosecution, dis-
missal, or transfer of certain officials without setting any deadlines
for their for their accomplishment."'
Furthermore, Annex 7 does not set priorities for the enactment of
its sections. '" For example, the provisions of Article II, discussing
the necessity for a "suitable condition for return," should be imple-
mented before minority returns are attempted.'
129. See id. at 808 (noting the military's reservation with regard to nation-
building after its experience in Somalia, yet distinguishing refugee return from
provision of aid, and advocating a military presence in Bosnia).
130. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7. 35 I.L.M. at 13641 (dis-
cussing the right of refugees to return and a general plan to implement that right,
but not setting any timeline).
131. See Minorit, Return or Mass Relocation,. supra note 64, at 2 (noting that
although international organizations have recognized the importance of Annex 7 of
the Dayton Accords and have attempted to make 1998 the year for the return of
minorities, most efforts have failed).
132. Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7. 35 I.L.M. at 137.
133. See id.
134. See id. Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 138 (enumerating, for example, enumerating
steps that would hinder the safe return of refugees without setting any deadlines or
priorities for their accomplishment).
135. See Boyd, supra note 9, at 47-48 (reiterating that the conditions must be
suitable and the effects of war must fade before the return of minority refugees can
succeed); see also Cousens, supra note 2, at 803-04 (remarking that one of the
failures of the Dayton Accords is its failure to prioritize its provisions).
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4. Too Much Power in the Parties' Hands
Annex 7 places too much power in the hands of the parties.' 6 In
Article II of Annex 7, the agreement explains that the "[p]arties
[must] undertake to create in their territories the political, economic,
and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmoni-
ous reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without prefer-
ence for any particular group."''3 7 Although this Article explains that
this undertaking must be in compliance with the U.N.H.C.R.,", it
places most of the responsibility with the parties.'3 9 The apportion-
ment of responsibility between three parties who have so recently
been at war with each other presents a significant risk of failure."41
The same individuals who incited conflict during the war are now in
high-ranking political positions in the parties,' 4' including a number
of alleged war criminals who hold political positions in Prijedor,
Omarska, and Bosanska Samac in Republika Srpska, as well as other
areas in the Federation of Bosnia. 142 The presence of these war crimi-
136. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 11, cl. 1, 35 I.L.M. at
138; see also Boyd, supra note 9, at 44 (implying that although many organiza-
tions have attempted to implement the civil elements of the Dayton Accords, a
more successful approach would have been through a single leader).
137. Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. II, cl. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 138.
138. See id. (stating that the plan for return of refugees must comply with the
U.N.H.C.R. repatriation plan).
139. See id. (giving the parties responsibility to create the suitable conditions for
return).
140. See Heartings, supra note 93, at I (arguing that Bosnia needs the support of
the international community to prevent the return of conflict to the region).
141. See The Dayton Accords and the Return of Bosnian Refiugees, supra note 7,
at I (claiming that the Dayton Accord's reliance on the parties is somewhat hypo-
critical because it encourages the parties to secure the environment for return when
the parties themselves were responsible for the "ethnic cleansing" in the region in
the first place).
142. See BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE: OBLIGATIONS, OPTIONS,
RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (The Balkan Institute, Aug., 1997), available in
<http://www.balkeninstitute.org/conference/bwjc-aug97.html> (identifying the
presence of war criminals in influential public positions throughout the Republika
Srpska, as well as the presence of the influential Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic). Accused war criminals also play a role in the Bosnian Croat part of the
Federation of Bosnia. See id. at 13.
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nals within the parties hinders the safe and expedient implementation
of Annex 7.14
5. A Contradiction Leading to a Separated Bosnia
Annex 7 creates a confusing discrepancy within the Dayton Ac-
cords.' 4 The Dayton Accords respects the separation between the
Federation of Bosnia and Republika Srpska.'" It even allows each
area to derive certain political and legal rights as provided in the
Bosnian Constitution in Annex 4."' Article I, Clause 1, however, al-
lows refugees to return to their original homes, and Article I, Clause
2 insists that the parties shall respect their decision to return and al-
low for their safe return.4 7 This individual choice given to refugees
regarding whether to return or relocate could, however, destroy the
very ethnic separation between the Federation and Republika Srpska
recognized by the Dayton Accords.'
143. See id. at 14 (declaring that the presence of war criminals hinders the return
of minority refugees because the refugees are intimidated by either fear or threats).
144. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 804 (finding a contradiction between the rec-
ognition of the separation between Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia
and the Annex 7 mandate that the parties accept the return of refugees).
145. See Paul C. Szasz, Introductor
, 
Note to the Bosnia and Her.egovina-
Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework--Agreement for Bosnia and Heriego-
vina with Annexes, 35 I.L.M. 75, 79 (recognizing the two entities within Bosnia as
the Republika Srpska, comprised of Bosnian Serbs. and the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina made up of both Bosniacs and Bosnian Croatians).
146. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 4, 35 I.L.M. at 118-28; see
also Boyd, supra note 9, at 46 (arguing that Dayton purposely created a weak cen-
tral government so that the minorities would be assured security); Szasz, supra
note 145, at 79 (noting that the central government has "a few defined responsi-
bilities," but that the rest of the power lies with the Entities).
147. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. I , cl. 1-2, 35 I.L.M. at
137.
148. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 804 (noting that the facilitation of returns
could reverse the division between the two entities); see also Boyd, supra note 9,
at 43 (alleging that the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats do not wish to live in
areas dominated by Muslims, thereby implying that the actual implementation of
Annex 7 and its return of refugees to areas where they would belong to ethnic mi-
norities could cause problems).
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Annex 7 fails to explain this contradiction.14 The result is that the
conception of power of the two separate entities has overpowered the
ideal of individual choice in Annex 7. The result is a country with
almost complete ethnic partition.' 0 The failure of Bosnia and the in-
ternational communities to enforce the provisions addressing refugee
return detailed in Annex 7 has resulted in a separated Bosnia, with
few minority returns.' 5'
D. BOSNIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX 7
The governments in Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bos-
nia have had little success implementing Annex 7V2 Although more
than 350,000 people have returned to Bosnia, few have returned to
places where they would comprise the ethnic minority.'5' In the two
years following the end of the war, only 30,000 people have returned
to those places that are "ethnically hostile,"'54 and a mere 2,200 mi-
norities have returned to Republika Srpska.' 5: The return of refugees
has been merely symbolic. 
5 6
149. See generalli Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, 35 1.L.M. at 89-
152.
150. See Boyd, supra note 9, at 46 ("Partition is what exists in Bosnia today.");
cf Cousens, supra note 2, at 816 (recognizing that the time to influence the nature
of the country's partitioning is now, for the implementers could go either way).
151. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 816 (discussing the possibility of a complete
partition of Bosnia).
152. See Self-Sustaining Structures, supra note 90, at 7 (identifying certain fail-
ures in the implementation of Annex 7).
153. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (stating that as of mid-1997,
300,000 refugees and displaced persons had returned, but that Bosnia's "divided
communities" have prevented many more from returning); see also MinoritY Re-
turn or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3 (recognizing the goal of partition by
nationalist leaders).
154. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9. But see INFORMATION NOTES-No.
1/98, supra note 19, at i (recognizing U.N.H.C.R.'s primary goal in 1998 as the
achievement of minority returns of 50,000 minority refugees or displaced persons).
155. See Minorit
, 
Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3.
156. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108 (iden-
tifying the symbolic meaning of the return of refugees by noting the somewhat
hopeless situation for return where people within a single municipality cannot re-
turn to their homes).
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The refugees and displaced persons are intimidated by several
factors including single-ethnicity police forces, propaganda spread
by the media, and general discrimination and harassment.'"' In some
areas, the local people completely disregard the laws concerning the
return of refugees. "' Through intimidation or even physical force, the
local people deny refugees the right to return, as well as the reacqui-
sition of their property.' 9 In the Kakanj municipality in the Federa-
tion, a single Croat refugee has yet to return.'' When refugees tried
to return they were compelled to leave within days."' An armed Bos-
nian Army Special Unit "2 passed through the areas in which the
Croats wished to return and destroyed Croat homes. Additionally, a
police force that was comprised of only one ethnic group and the
media propagated ethnic tensions thereby making return a dangerous
option.6 1 In another area in Bosnia, on April 8, 1998, a group of ap-
proximately sixty angry Serbs accosted a group of Bosniac displaced
persons and refugees when the group attempted to visit damaged
homes in Novi Grad on the Muslim holiday of Bajram. "
157. See id. (elaborating on specific situations where return has been impossible
because of such factors as a police force comprised of a single ethnic group and
harassment).
158. See U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item 112(c), supra note 86, at 5 (recounting vari-
ous stories where the local people destroyed the property or used violence to pre-
vent the return of refugees); see generally Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Bosnia, supra note 108, at 4-17 (providing several examples where the local peo-
ple prevented refugee return through violence or intimidation).
159. See Report on the Human Rights Situation ii Bosnia, supra note 108 (not-
ing that people are afraid to return because of the threats, and that some people
even leave after resettling due to physical abuse or intimidation); see also U.N.
GAOR, Agenda Item 112(c), supra note 86, at 7.
160. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108 (ex-
plaining that before the war, 29.8% of the 5,857 people in the Kakanj municipality
were Bosnian Croats, but now no Bosnian-Croat citizens currently residing in Ka-
kanj).
161. See id. (describing different circumstances that caused Bosnian Croat refu-
gees to leave including the destruction of their property and biased television cov-
erage).
162. See id. (noting that the "Black Swans," the Army Special Unit, have been
involved in destroying the property of refugees who wished to return).
163. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108, at 5.
164. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at iv (describing a
situation where about 500 Bosnian Muslim refugees could not embark on an or-
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In addition to intimidation by local residents, the local authorities
usurp power and directly violate the refugees' rights. 61 In the Jajce
municipality, the local authorities have denied Bosniacs and Serbs
not only the right to register, but also the right to visit homes in the
area.' 66 In the Municipality of Zepce, local authorities have used the
"reciprocity principle" to prevent minorities from returning.' 6 In one
case, local authorities prevented two Bosniac women from returning
to their flat in the Zepce municipality by invoking the "reciprocity"
principle."' The local authorities claimed that since the Bosniacs
were not accepting the return of refugees in the Bosniac controlled
areas of Zenica, Zavidovici, and Maglaj, the women could not return
to Zepce.
169
Finally, in some regions, even if specific laws have been adopted,
the local governments refuse to enforce them.170 In the Zenica mu-
nicipality, 7' the government adopted the Law on the Transfer of So-
ganized trip when an angry crowd of Bosnian Serbs attacked them); see also U.N.
GAOR, Item 112(c), supra note 86, at 5 (recounting another story of tension when
a group of displaced persons tried to inspect their homes in Republika Srpska, but
did not have the government's permission).
165. See generally Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note
108 (describing situations throughout the Federation of Bosnia where local
authorities have assumed power and used it to affect the peoples' rights).
166. See id. (noting how policemen in the Jajce municipality have violated fun-
damental rights, preventing Bosniacs and Serbs from registering or visiting their
homes).
167. See id. (explaining how the Bosnian-Croats in the Zepce municipality rely
on a theory of reciprocity to deny the return of Bosnian Muslim refugees). The
"reciprocity principle" is a situation where one ethnic group denies the return of
members of another ethnic group, claiming a right to do so based on the fact that
the other ethnic group first denied its members' return. See iM.
168. See id. (describing the case of Prasko Selma and her mother, Babinjac
Semka, who were unable to return to their original home).
169. See id. (detailing the Bosnian Croats use of the "reciprocity principle" to
deny the return of Bosnian Muslim refugees).
170. See generally Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note
108 (presenting stories where the authorities used the law in a biased or unfair
manner, including police who refused to enforce laws and government officials
who implemented laws unfairly). There are no cantonial municipal forces in cen-
tral Bosnia. See id. Rather, the police forces are comprised of one ethnic group. See
id. This affects the enforcement of laws as well as police reaction to events such as
murder and desecration of property. See id.
171. See id. at 3 (recognizing that the Zenica municipality according to a 1991
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cially-Owned Property into State Property."" When the Executive
Board to enforce this law was established, however, it ignored the
rights of the Croats, appointing just three Croats out of a total of 115
members.' 73 This creates a situation in which people are not accorded
the same legal and political rights."" In effect, this determines not
only where people are able to return, but also affects the political
power within the area. Moreover, it affects the passage of future laws
that would facilitate returns and the reacquisition of property."
E. RECENT ACTIONS IN THE BOSNIAN FEDERATION
Local governments have made little progress in their attempt to
implement Annex 77. Recently, however, the Federation of Bosnia
has taken some steps to advance the enforcement of Annex 7." On
April 4, 1998, the Federation of Bosnia's government amended some
important property legislation that was necessary to allow refugees
and displaced persons to reacquire their land.""
First, the Law Regulating Application of the Law on Temporarily
Abandoned Real Property'7 ' allows those refugees who own private
census had 145,577 people with 80,477 (55.2%) Bosniacs; 22,651 or (15.6%) Bos-
nian Croats; 22,592 (15.5%) Bosnian Serbs and 19,957 or (13.7%) others).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 4 (noting that the failure to include Bosnian Croats was the will of
the SDA party, the Bosnian Muslim party, which has complete power in Zenica).
174. See id. (explaining how the harassment and discrimination affects the eth-
nic minorities and their return).
175. See id.
176. See supra notes 152-75 and accompanying text (examining the implemen-
tation of Annex 7 within Bosnia).
177. See Sarajevo Declaration, available in <http://www.pscebih.org
sardec.htm> (last modified Feb. 3, 1998) (exploring methods for implementing
Annex 7); see also INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2198, supra note 63, at 3-5 (dis-
cussing the most recent property legislation in the Federation of Bosnia in attempts
to implement Annex 7).
178. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at 3-5 (detailing the
new legislation and explaining that the legislation was printed in the Official Ga-
zette in Bosnia on April 3, 1998).
179. See id. at 3 (explaining how the Law on Temporarily Abandoned Real
Property Owned by Citizens overturns the law that was adopted during the war).
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property to file a claim to reacquire their property. "o If the property is
abandoned or someone is illegally living there, the owner may take
ownership immediately.'"' Second, the Law on Cessation of the Ap-
plication of the Law on Abandoned Apartments"2 applies to socially-
owned apartments and determines that the decisions ending occu-
pancy rights of refugees and displaced persons are null and void."'
Third, the Law on Taking Over the Law on Housing Relations legis-
lation that had stated that an occupancy right could be canceled if the
occupant had not resided in the apartment for a continuous period of
six months, by making it inapplicable to people with the right to re-
turn under Annex 7. 14 Finally, the Law on the Purchase of Apart-
ments with the Occupancy Rights 85 deals with the applications to so-
cially-owned apartments. ' This legislation by the Federation is a
first step in local government action to ensure the return of displaced
refugees.1
7
Republika Srpska has, to this date, made no advancements in
amending their property legislation.' Property laws in this area still
180. See id. (noting that people may reclaim their land at any time and that the
authorities must resolve the claims within thirty days).
181. See id. (noting that if the property is vacant or someone is illegally living
there, the person may move in immediately, yet explaining how if there is a tempo-
rary owner, the person must wait ninety days).
182. See id. (detailing the differences between the old law that was issued during
the war and the new law recently adopted).
183. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at 3 (explaining that
the law overturns the previous Law on Abandoned Apartments, which allowed
authorities to take property and call it abandoned if the person left).
184. See id. at 4 (explaining the Law on Housing Relations and its applicability
to "socially owned" apartments).
185. See id. at 4-5 (noting the amendments to the law that were passed on March
4, 1998). A person who acquired rights to an apartment that was declared "aban-
doned" since 1991, is not allowed to purchase the apartment. See id.
186. See id.
187. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining that a
campaign will inform people of their rights, but that there must be adequate im-
plementation for these laws to be effective).
188. See id. (discussing how the property laws in the Republika Srspka have not
been amended at this time but noting that a group has been established to work on
amending the laws).
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fail to meet international standards.' There is hope, however, that
with the new government in the Republika Srpska, progress will
soon follow.'"
F. THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE
Annex 7 offers the U.N.H.C.R. a significant role in implementing
the Dayton Accords. 9' Article I of Annex 7 identifies the U.N.H.C.R.
as the organization responsible for developing a comprehensive plan
for refugee return.'92 The parties in the Federation of Bosnia and the
Republika Srpska are responsible for implementing and working in
compliance with this designated plan.'" Article III of Annex 7 further
specifies that:
Parties shall give full and unrestricted access by UNHCR, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme ("UNDP"), and other relevant international, domes-
tic, and nongovernmental organizations to all refugees and displaced
persons, with a view to facilitating the work of those organizations in
tracing persons, the provision of medical assistance, food distribution,
reintegration assistance, the provision of temporary and permanent hous-
189. See id.; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
supra note 2, at 170 (stating that the government in the Republika Srpska has not
complied with the provisions of Annex 7 and with the return of refugees). Property
lavs must meet with international standards including the standards designated in
the Dayton Accords, which ensure the people that they are able to reacquire the
land that they were deprived of during the war. See INFORMATION NOTES-No.
2/98, supra note 63, at 7. The lack of action in amending property laws in Repub-
lika Srpska demonstrates their refusal to reform the current property situation and
in disparity with international standards. See id.
190. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
170 (suggesting that the new government in the Republika Srpska could expedite
property reform); see also MinoritO, Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3
(noting that the international agencies have discarded the deferential approach to
Bosnia's nationalist leaders and are now "taking them on" as seen with the ap-
pointment of Milorad Dodik).
191. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. I - IV, 35 I.L.M. at
137-38 (detailing the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
in the implementation of Annex 7 and the return of refugees).
192. See id. Annex 7, art. I, cl. 5, 35 I.L.M. at 137 (explaining how U.N.H.C.R.
will develop a plan with the parties that will facilitate the early return of refugees).
193. See id. (noting that the parties agreed to implement the plan designed by
U.N.H.C.R.).
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ing, and other activities vital to the discharge of their mandates and op-
erational responsibilities without administrative impediments."
9 4
These sections of the agreement grant considerable power to the
U.N.H.C.R. 95 They allow the U.N.H.C.R. to assist in developing and
implementing a plan without constraints from the parties.' The
U.N.H.C.R. has utilized this mandate to assist in the return of over
350,000 refugees and displaced persons.'97 It has also adopted nu-
merous plans to encourage returns.' These plans include activities
such as running buses for refugees and displaced persons to bring
them to their original homes and cities,'" and building new homes to
create more habitable apartments thereby decreasing the housing
shortage.
The "Open City Initiative," however, is the fundamental
U.N.H.C.R. plan enacted to encourage and facilitate minority re-
turns. 2°' An "Open City" must be genuinely dedicated to the minority
194. See id. Annex 7, art. III, cl. 2, 35 I.L.M. at 138.
195. See id. Annex 7, arts. I-IV, 35 I.L.M. at 137-38 (explaining the roles of
U.N.H.C.R. in facilitating of the return of refugees).
196. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, arts. I-IV, 35 I.L.M. at
137-38 (noting the parties acceptance of Annex 7 and the agreement to implement
the U.N.H.C.R. plan).
197. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (quoting the number of refugees
that have returned to date); see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, supra note 2, at 170 (elucidating the roles of U.N.H.C.R. in the return
of refugees).
198. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
170 (detailing different plans by which U.N.H.C.R. has attempted to implement
Annex 7).
199. See id. (describing a project developed through U.N.H.C.R. to raise the
confidence of those wishing to return by allowing them to visit their original
homes and cities on U.N.H.C.R. buses); see also Interview with Katie Byrne,
Worker for the Hungarian Refugee Support Group, in Washington, D.C. (June 16,
1998) (explaining how the U.N.H.C.R. visit from the refugee camp in Debrecen,
Hungary to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina helped to reassure the refugees that the
situation was safe to return).
200. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
170 (explaining how sixty percent of the housing stock was ruined in Bosnia dur-
ing the war and how U.N.H.C.R. attempted to address this issue by repairing
homes only if the governments would accept minority returns).
201. See NATO/SFOR: Joint Press Conference, M2 Presswire, Jan. 26, 1998
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return process and demonstrate this commitment to the U.N.H.C.R.
The U.N.H.C.R. works with local governments to design a plan for
being "open."2' 3 To date, the U.N.C.H.R. has accepted fourteen cities
as "Open Cities.' 204 The international community's involvement is
necessary, however, to ensure each city's dedication to being
"open. 2' 5 This international support and involvement will lead to
strict and accurate implementation.
Although the "Open City" plan and the role of the U.N.H.C.R., as
described in Annex 7, appears strong, it has encountered numerous
problems.206 First, the U.N.H.C.R.'s selection of "Open Cities" is
random,20 7 and does not adequately apply a specified selection proc-
ess.08 Second, the "Open City" plan fails to address other crucial
problems.2 O These problems include, but are not limited to, property
(explaining how U.N.H.C.R. will use 80% of their funding for the "'Open City"
initiative); see also NATO: Report of the Secretar-General on the United Nations
Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina, M2 Presswire, June 20, 1997, available in 1997
WL 11935590 [hereinafter NATO: Report on U.N. Mission]. "Building upon grass-
roots initiatives, U.N.H.C.R. and its partners offer support and material assistance
to villages and municipalities which volunteer to declare themselves 'Open Cities'
by welcoming previous residents from all ethnic communities who wish to return."
Id.
202. See NATO: Report on U.N. Mission, supra note 201 (explaining how the
recognition of an "Open City" depends on the city's dedication to being open).
203. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 4 (explaining
that U.N.H.C.R. assistance with an open city plan depends on the commitment of
the local government to abide by the plan's terms).
204. See NA TOISFOR: Joint Press Conference, M2 Presswire, Aug. 18, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 16518508 (identifying U.N.H.C.R.'s current recognition of
fourteen "Open Cities").
205. See NATOISFOR: Joint Press Conference, M2 Presswire, Oct. 23, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 15140620 (noting the need for international compliance
with regard to the "Open Cities").
206. See NATOISFOR: Joint Press Conference, supra note 204 (explaining how
two mayors in "Open Cities" claimed that the cities are no more than status); see
also Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 4 (noting that although
U.N.H.C.R. has invested eighty percent of its funds into "Open Cities," the project
has seen minimal success).
207. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 4 (claiming that
one of the failures of the "Open City" initiative is the lack of an adequate selection
process).
208. See id.
209. See id. (detailing how the "Open City" initiative does not address certain
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issues and housing shortages."1 The "Open City" initiative attempts
to facilitate returns without addressing these other issues."' Finally,
Annex 7 fails to designate a specific international implementation
force to oversee the "Open City" initiative."' Rather, it relies on im-
plementation by the international community in broad terms. The
lack of an implementation and monitoring force has culminated in
disappointing results, including few minority returns."2 3
III. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
The refugee situation in Bosnia has historical precedent.2 4 In fact,
one has only to look to the situation in Israel with the Palestinian
refugees to understand the complexities that exist with the failed re-
turn of refugees and the possible disastrous results of a failed imple-
211
mentation.
The Palestinian refugee situation extends back fifty years and
therefore is considered by some to be the "oldest and largest refugee
problem."2 '6 To date, according to the United Nations Relief and
issues such as housing).
210. See id. (explaining how "Open Cities" do not address "property rights vio-
lations, housing shortages, and double occupancy").
211. See id. (stating that "Open Cities" attempt to facilitate minority returns, but
fail to address other issues such as property rights).
212. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. l-IV, 35 I.L.M. at 137-
38 (mentioning U.N.H.C.R.'s promise to develop a plan for the return of refugees
but failing to mention how this plan will be implemented and monitored).
213. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 4 (examining
the reasons for the disappointing results of U.N.H.C.R.'s "Open City" plan).
214. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
175 (offering examples of numerous countries where refugee return has been a
problem including Afghanistan, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Rwanda).
215. See Weiner, supra note 81, at I (noting that the basis of the Palestinians'
conflict with Israel is the refugee return issue); see also Palestinians Act Out Kill-
ing of Israeli Soldier in West Bank Protest, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 12,
1998, at 1 (detailing an incident where Palestinians acted out the killing of an Is-
raeli soldier to demonstrate their demand for the return of the Palestinian refugees).
216. See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Palestinian Refugees:
Fifty Years of Injustice (visited July 12, 1998) <http://nmopic.pna.net/un/
unpal_ 948.htm> (stating that the Palestinian refugee problem is five decades old
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Works Agency ("U.N.R.W.A."),2 there are 2.7 million Palestinian
refugees.2 1  These refugees are scattered throughout the Middle East,
with highest concentrations in Jordan
'19 and Lebanon.2"
The refugees that exist today originate from two different time pe-
riods, 1948 and 1967. The origination of the 1948 refugees exacer-
bates the present-day conflict, with a virulent debate occurring today
over exactly what happened.'" During the 1948 time period, some
750,000 Palestinians were compelled to leave. " The Israelis claim
that the Palestinians voluntarily left at the command of Arab leaders
and has been an issue since the creation of the United Nations); UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2. at 249. The United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine ("U.N.R.W.A.") defines Palestinian refu-
gees as those people, or their descendants, who lived in Palestine two years prior to
1948 and lost their homes as a result of the hostilities between Israel and Palestine.
See id.
217. See ARZT, supra note 10, at 23 (explaining that the U.N.R.W.A. pro'ided
food, shelter, health services, and training for Palestinians in the host countries to
which they fled); see also RAMZIH RABAH, PALESTINIAN REFUGEES A\ND
DISPLACED AND THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS 5-7 (1996) (discussing the is-
sues of Palestinian refugees and their displacement from the West Bank and Gaza
Strip). The U.N.R.W.A. is the organization that addresses the Palestinian refugee
problem. See id.
218. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 8 (stating that as of 1992, according to the
U.N.R.W.A., there were 2.7 million Palestinian refugees). Israel, however, dis-
agrees with this figure, arguing that it does not discern between 1948 refugees and
1967 displaced persons. See id. One Israeli researcher estimated that the total num-
ber of Palestinian refugees is 1.9 million. See id. On the other hand, a Palestinian
refugee estimated that there are four million refugees. See id.
219. See Rex Bymen, Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process,
in NEW HAMPSHIRE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR/YALE-MARIA LECTURE IN MIDDLE
EAST STUDIES 3 (1991) (noting that as of June 1997, there were 1,413,252 regis-
tered Palestinian refugees living in Jordan).
220. See id. (noting that as of June 1997, there were 359,005 registered Pales-
tinian refugees living in Lebanon).
221. See id. at I (describing the conflict that exists over the origin of the 1948
Palestinian refugees).
222. See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, supra note 216, at I
(claiming that there were 750,000 Palestinian refugees as a result of the 1948 war
and establishment of the state of Israel). But see Weiner, supra note 81, at 7 (re-
porting that while the U.N. estimates the number of 1948 refugees to be approxi-
mately 604,000, about half of the Palestinian population living in Israel at the time,
independent researchers state that the number is about 540,000, while Arab states
argue the number is closer to 900,000).
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to avoid the ensuing conflict and to protest the establishment of a
Jewish state.223 The Palestinians, on the other hand, argue that they
were forced to leave by the omnipresent militarism brought on by the
Israelis' desire for a Jewish state.224 After the Palestinians left, their
property was taken and they therefore were unable to return."'
The other large faction of Palestinian refugees is a result of the
Arab-Israeli "Six-Day War" in 1967. This war was prompted by an
Israeli strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, when Gamal Abkel
Nasser, the leader of Egypt, stated his intentions to destroy Israel and
concentrated troops along the border.2 6 During this time period, the
U.N.R.W.A. estimates that 250,000 Palestinians were forced to leave
their homes in Israel.
227
B. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY
The Palestinians claim that their right to return is an "integral part
of an individual's fundamental rights. 228 They base this claim on in-
ternational legal authority, including numerous United Nations
documents. 229 These documents include the following: United Decla-
223. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 2 (arguing that the Palestinians chose to
leave Palestine either by their own will or at the command of the Arab leaders); see
also Weiner, supra note 81, at 21-22 (relating the Israeli's' position regarding the
Palestinian refugees of 1948).
224. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 2 (stating that the Palestinians were forced
from their homes for reasons, including the formation of a Zionist state); see also
Weiner, supra note 81, at 15-16 (explaining the position of the Palestinians re-
garding Palestinian refugees of 1967).
225. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 2.
226. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM 15-16 (1995) (re-
counting the beginnings of the "Six Day War").
227. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 7 (noting that Israeli researchers have argued
that only 250,000 Palestinian became refugees as a result of the 1967 war). But see
Palestinian National Authority Official Website, supra note 216 (arguing that
325,000 Palestinians became refugees as a result of the 1967 war).
228. Manuel Hassassian, Historical Justice and Compensation for Palestinians
(visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.pna.net/peace/historical-justice.htm> (as-
serting that a refugee's right of return is fundamental and undeniable).
229. See id. (detailing the numerous international documents asserting a per-
son's right to return to their country); see also ARZT, supra note 10, at 63-66 (dis-
cussing the imperative question if there is a Palestinian "right of return" within the
context of the international law).
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ration of Human Rights,-"' the Human Commission on Human
Rights,-' United Nations Resolution 194,7'2 and United Nations
Resolution 237.23
Each of these international documents reiterates a person's right to
return to his or her country.2' For example, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states that a person has a right to leave and return
to their country. 35 The Human Commission on Human Rights fur-
thers this point by declaring, "[e]veryone is entitled, without distinc-
tion of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political,
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth marriage,
or other status to return to his own country."2"
Although these documents serve as a general legal basis for return,
Palestinian refugees cite United Nations Resolution 194 most often
when declaring their right to return!'" United Nations Resolution 194
discusses the situation in Palestine and specifies in paragraph 11 that:
refugees who wish to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to
return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments
or authorities responsible.2z
230. Universal Declaration of Hunian Rights. supra note 29.
231. Human Commission, supra note 30.
232. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.. pt. 1. para. 21, U.N. Doe. A/810
(1948).
233. S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 22nd Sess., 1361st mtg., at 5. U.N. Doc.
S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967).
234. See infra notes 235-40 (discussing documents that reiterate a refugee's
right of return).
235. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 29, art. 13 (de-
claring that '[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his own country").
236. Human Commission, supra note 30.
237. See RABAH, supra note 217, at 4 (identifying United Nations Resolution
194 as the main source of reference for Palestinian return).
238. G.A. Res. 194, supra note 232, par. 11.
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This resolution also specifies that a Conciliation Commission should
advance the return of the refugees or compensation payment.2"
These documents collectively form a foundation for the Palestin-
ian refugees' plea for return. 40 To date, the Israelis and Palestinians
have developed five legal agreements outlining such areas as military
presence, the Gaza strip, and administrative matters. Although
these documents advanced the goal of peace in the area, they make
little mention of returning the refugees.
42
C. CALAMITOUS MISTAKES WITH PALESTINIAN REFUGEE RETURN
The parties of Palestine and Israel have made several mistakes
with the facilitation of the return of the Palestinian refugees.24 First,
the great length of time between the period when the refugees first
came into existence, 1948, and the present time has heightened ten-
sions and minimized the chance for adequate and complete returs144
239. See id.
240. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 13 (identifying documents such as United
Nations Resolution 194 as forming a basis for right of the Palestinian refugees to
return to Israel).
241. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 3-4. The Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements ("D.O.P.") formed a foundation for negotiations
between Palestine and Israel. See id. at 3. The Israel-Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area ("Cairo Agreement") de-
veloped a plan for the partial withdrawal of military forces in the Gaza strip and
Jericho area and the transfer of local administration to the Palestinian Authority.
See id. The Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities ("Erez Agree-
ment") granted a transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority in such areas as
health, tourism, and social welfare. See id. The Protocol on Further Transfer of
Powers and Responsibilities ("Further Transfer Protocol") transfers authority in the
West Bank to the Palestinian Authority in such areas as labor, industry, and local
government. See id. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip ("Oslo II") supersedes previous agreements except the D.O.P. See
id. at 4. Oslo II set standards for Palestinian residents in the area and gave PLO
chairmen jurisdiction over much of the West Bank and Gaza strip. See id.
242. See id.
243. See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, supra note 216 (iden-
tifying the numerous problems involved with the Palestinian refugee situation and
the need for a solution).
244. See id. (calling the fifty years of struggle of the Palestinian refugees an in-
justice). But see Weiner, supra note 8 1, at 29 (suggesting that Israel's delay in fa-
cilitating the return of the Palestinian refugees may be a result of Israel's state of
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In addition, the lack of a comprehensive, detailed plan for the return
of refugees allowed the problem to intensify with little hope for a
resolution.245
1. A Prolonged Crisis
The U.N.H.C.R. stresses the importance of early planning to fa-
cilitate the return of refugees.4 It notes that early planning and im-
plementation are imperative because the results of a prolonged refu-
gee crisis can be disastrous.24"" For example, the protracted nature of
the Palestinian refugee crisis and the inability of the parties to solve
the problem allowed the complexities of the situation to maximize.2"
Numerous problems have resulted, including adverse effects on the
peace negotiations 24 and settlements, as well as heightened tensions
and a rise in nationalism.":'
a. A Prolonged Refugee Situation and its Effects on Peace in the
Region
Both the Palestinians and the Israelis look at the procurement of
the refugee situation as a necessary step towards achieving peace in
emergency with the surrounding Arab countries).
245. See Artz, supra note 10, at 63-66 (analyzing whether there is a definitive
for the return of the Palestinian refugees based on binding international law).
246. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
175 (recognizing that early planning and facilitation is imperative for successful
returns).
247. See id. at 175-176 (noting that early planning discourages dependency and
provides the refugees with the necessary skills to assimilate into the community as
they return).
248. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 21 (stating that the refugee problem in the
Middle East and the lack of a solution will result in long-term suffering the pre-
vention of an eduring peace plan).
249. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 2 (claiming that the settlement of a peace
project depends on the successful resolution of the Palestinian refugee situation);
see also Byrnen, supra note 219, at 21 (asserting that the conflict between the Pal-
estinians and Israelis cannot be resolved without a solution to the Palestinian refu-
gee issue).
250. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 2 (attributing the nationalistic feelings among
the Palestinian people to the plight of the Palestinian refugees).
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the Middle East.25' According to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, there will never be a final peace settlement if the Pales-
tinian refugees do not give up their demand for the return of refu-
gees. 252 The Palestinians, on the other hand, claim that a peace ar-
rangement cannot be completed without the return of the refugees.2 '
Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), Palestinian Legislative Council speaker,
noted that the return of the Palestinian refugees to present day Israel
stays at the center of the conflict.2 4 In addition, the Palestinian Na-
tional Council recently reported that even though they are in support
of a peace settlement, the refugee situation must be solved before a
settlement is made.255
The refugee issue is at the heart of the conflict between Israel and
the Palestinians. 25' An adequate peace settlement depends on the
resolution of the refugee problem. 257 To date, however, none of the
agreements have adequately addressed this topic. 58 Perpetual conflict
251. See id. at I (identifying the struggle for return as a major factor affecting
the peace negotiations); see also ARZT, supra note 10, at 2 (recognizing the use of
the refugees as pawns in the conflict).
252. See Netanyahu Resists Push on Pullback, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1998, at 18
(stating that the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would not accept a peace
settlement if the Palestinian refugees continue to demand the right to return), see
also Milosevic Pledged to Stop, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 17, 1998, at I (reporting
that the Prime Minister would not complete a peace agreement unless the Pales-
tinians drop their demand of right to return).
253. See PNC Members Calls for Palestinian State. XINHUA ENGLIS11
NEWSWIRE, May 16, 1998 (stating that the Palestinian refugees will not achieve a
peace agreement without the return of the refugees).
254. See Steve Rodan & Mohammed Najib, PA Will Announce State Des7)ite Is-
raeli Threats, JERUSALEM POST, June 19, 1998 (reporting that Palestinian Legisla-
tive Council speaker, Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) stated that the refugee issue is at the
heart of the conflict between Palestine and Israel).
255. See id.
256. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (noting the disagreement
between the Palestinians and Israelis regarding the importance of refugee return).
257. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 21 (stating that the development of a suc-
cessful peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis depends on a
successful solution to the refugee issue).
258. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 4 (explaining that the five bilateral agree-
ments between the Palestinian and Israeli parties only nominally address the refu-
gee issue).
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among the parties is the result. -'9 The parties are unwilling to concede
to political settlements due to the prolongment of the refugee crisis.
b. Heightened Tensions and Nationalism
The parties' inability to solve the refugee crisis has led to a society
imbued with nationalism and heightened tensions. '' Both the Pales-
tinians and Israelis have turned away from relying on international
legal authority and diplomatic means.2" Rather, both parties have
turned to more violent actions. 2"2
The suffering of the Palestinian refugees has been a major factor
in the growth of nationalism among the Palestinian people, "' and has
led to the increased use of violence by Palestinians. The Palestinian
refugees, many of whom currently live in refugee camps,2' fre-
quently resort to violent protests in a desperate plea to return to their
country. On May 14, 1998, in Hebron, several thousand people
259. See id. (explaining that the five bilateral agreements between the Palestin-
ian and Israeli parties only minimally address the refugee issue).
259. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text (presenting the opposing
positions taken by the Palestinians and Israelis).
260. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 17 (explaining that the Palestinian refugee
crisis is at the core of Palestinian nationalism, beginning with the first refugees of
1947 and growing with the new influx of refugees after 1967).
261. See John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, HARV.
INT'L L.J. 171, 182-87 (1998) (defining Israel's recalcitrance in implementing in-
ternational legal authority, with an emphasis on U.N. Resolution 194); see also Is-
rael Not the hInocent Victim of Arabs that Many Portray State to Be, SUN-
SENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, June 16, 1998, at 4G (stating that Israel occupies the
country in contravention of U.N. resolutions); Weiner, supra note 81, at 18 (stating
that the Palestinian National Authority has relied on a Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization Covenant asserting that an armed revolution will free the state of Pales-
tine, allowing the people to return).
262. See Rodan & Najib, supra note 254, at 2 (explaining that the creation of a
Palestinian state would provoke countermeasures from Israel).
263. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 17 (identifying the refugee issues of 1948
and 1967 as the main source of nationalism).
264. See Byrnen, supra note 219, at 3 (stating that fifty-five percent of the refu-
gees in Gaza, more than fifty percent of the refugees in Lebanon, twenty-nine per-
cent of the refugees in Syria, twenty-six percent of refugees living in the West
Bank, and eighteen percent of the refugees living in Jordan reside in refugee
camps).
265. See infi-a notes 266-71 and accompanying text (offering situations where
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marched across the city and released balloons that stated their right
to return.166 At this same protest, a band of men with black masks ut-
tered harsh words of disapproval against the Prime Minister Benja-
min Netanyahu. 7
The Palestinian refugees have extended their cries to countries
where they have resettled.16' Their desire to return to their country is
mixed with nationalism. In a Palestinian refugee camp in Syria," '7
for example, the refugees have renamed the streets, villages, and
shops after cities where they previously lived or defeated the Is-
raelis.-7
The prolongment of the refugee crisis has also increased national-
ism among the Israeli people.7 2 The Israeli people feel threatened by
the large influx of refugees. 273 They believe this influx would not
only threaten the security of Israel, but also affect such factors as
employment and housing.274 The Prime Minister and other political
figures have denounced the idea of return.'
Palestinian refugees have turned to desparate pleas for return).
266. See Ann LoLordo, Six Palestinians Killed in Israel Violence; 'Day of
Mourning' Erupts into Confrontations with Troops; Scores Hurt, BALTIMORE SUN,
May 15, 1998, at 15A (describing the demonstration and the events that occurred).
267. See id.
268. See Roveida Mabardi, Palestinian Refugees in Syria Yearn to Return to
"Lost Land", AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 13, 1998 (noting that the Palestinian
refugees espouse the hope for return while in a Syrian refugee camp).
269. See id. (noting that the Palestinian refugees in a refugee camp in Syria hope
only for the chance to return).
270. See id. (describing the Yarmuk refugee camp south of the capital city of
Damascus).
271. See id. The Palestinian refugees in Syria have renamed certain streets after
places in Palestine (modem-day Israel), such as Haifa. See id. The Palestinian
refugees have also renamed areas after Palestinian tragedies, such as "Deir Yassin"
hospital, a name commemorating a village where Israeli soldiers killed 200 Pales-
tinians. See id.
272. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 11-12 (detailing possible security threats that
would arise with the return of the Palestinian refugees).
273. See id. at 30-31 (explaining that the return of a large population of Pales-
tinian refugees could threaten the existence of Israel as a state).
274. See id. (noting that the a return of the Palestinian refugees could result in an
influx of people affecting the demographics and security within Israel).
275. See Netanyahu Resists Push on Pullback, supra note 252 (quoting Prime
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2. The Lack of a Legal Plan.for Return
The lack of a comprehensive agreement between the parties has
prevented the expedient return of the Palestinian refugees.2" The Pal-
estinian refugees rest their basis to return on numerous international
legal authorities. 77 Although these documents ensure their right of
return, they are not legally binding on sovereign states.:
The Palestinians most often utilize United Nations Resolution 194
as legal authority ensuring their right of return. ' This document
mentions the right of return, 8' however, its ambiguity has allowed
the Israelis to avoid its implementaton." First, the exact language in
the document says that the refugees "should" be allowed to return,
rather than "must" be allowed to return.22 Second, the document
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's statement that if the Palestinians demand the right
of return, "There will be no agreement.").
276. See Quigley, supra note 261, at 185 (noting that the inconsistencies with
the principal source of international legal authority, U.N. Resolution 194, have led
to the failure of return).
277. See supra notes 228-42 and accompanying text (analyzing the Palestinian's
right of return according to such international agreements as the United Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the Human Commission on Human Rights, United Nations
Resolution 194, and United Nations Resolution 237).
278. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 41 (remarking that resolutions from the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations usually are not binding on sovereign states).
But see BARRY E. CARTER AND PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2d
ed. 1995) (recognizing that although the decisions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations are not a formal source of law, they do have international political
significance).
279. See RABAH, supra note 217, at 3-4 (claiming that United Nations Resolu-
tion 194 provides legal basis for the right of refugees to return).
280. See G.A. Res. 194, supra note 232, para. I1 (asserting the Palestinians'
right of return).
281. See Quigley, supra note 261, at 185 (identifying certain problems with
United Resolutions 194 and suggesting these problems have allowed Israel to
avoid its implementation).
282. See G.A. Res. 194, supra note 232, para. 11 (resolving that "the refugees
wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date."); see also Weiner, supra note
81, at 41 (quoting Professor Ruth Lapidoth that United Nations Resolution 194's
use of "should" only "recommends that the refugees 'should' be permitted to re-
turn"). But see Quigley, supra note 261, at 189-90 (claiming that even if the lan-
guage in United Nations Resolution 194 is ambiguous, numerous subsequent
resolutions substantiate the right of return).
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states that only those refugees willing to live at peace with their
neighbors should be able to return. 83 Finally, the document offers no
specific date for implementation. Rather, it states the resolution
must be administered at the "earliest practicable date." '285 The vague-
ness of this language allows the Israelis to circumvent permission for
286refugee returns.
Apart from Resolution 194, the parties have never developed a le-
gally binding document specifically addressing the return of the Pal-
estinian refugees.2 7 This has allowed Israel to ignore the refugees'
cries and has prolonged the situation.288
IV. LEARNING FROM OTHER'S MISTAKES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF ANNEX 7 AND THE FACILITATION OF THE
RETURN OF REFUGEES IN BOSNIA
The mistakes made by the parties in Palestine and Israel serve as
important lessons for the parties in Bosnia. 89 Bosnia must learn from
283. See G.A. Res. 194, supra note 232, para. II; see also Quigley, supra note
261, at 187 (asserting that the use of the phrase "only Palestinians wishing to 'live
in peace' has allowed various interpretations). But see id. at 187 (stating that sub-
sequent to United Nations Resolution 194, the General Assembly omitted the
phrase "live in peace" and conferred a genuine right of return).
284. See G.A. Res. 194, supra note 232, para. 11; see also Quigley, supra note
261, at 188 (recognizing that the phrase "at the earliest practicable date" has al-
lowed the Israelis to prevent the return of refugees).
285. G.A. Res. 194, supra note 232, para. 11.
286. See supra notes 281-86.
287. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 43 (noting that even if the Palestinian refu-
gees do not have international legal authority to substantiate their return, they may
be able to substantiate their right of return through their presence on the land and
their continued suffering); ARZT, supra note 10, at 66 (stating that there is not a
solid legal justification for the return of Palestinian refugees within 1967 borders).
288. See Quigley, supra note 261, at 185 (suggesting that the ambiguities within
United Nations Resolution 194 allowed Israel to ignore the cries for return of the
Palestinian refugees).
289. See supra pt. III.C (examining why there has been a failure to return the
Palestinian refugees and what has been the result). But see UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at 175 (claiming that each country
must plan its own method for return, concentrating on the specific situation in the
country).
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these mistakes to avoid the same unfortunate consequences. The pos-
sible consequences include, but are not limited to, the resurgence of
nationalism290 and increased tensions among the ethnic groups in
Bosnia, specifically between those parties proposing the quick and
expedient return of refugees and the parties working to block the ef-
forts. 9 Moreover, there is the fear that the endangerment to the
peace process could result in the nullification of the Dayton Peace
Accords.292
A. SOLVING THE REFUGEE SITUATION QUICKLY
The Bosnian refugee problem and the failed implementation of
Annex 7 must be remedied quickly to avoid the disastrous conse-
quences seen in Israel with the Palestinian refugees. Expedient fa-
cilitation can be achieved by addressing the following problems and
implementing the proposed solutions.
290. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (arguing the failure to implement
the Dayton Accords and facilitate the return of the Bosnian refugees could moti-
vate the refugees to use more drastic means to promote their return); see also Mi-
nority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64 (identifying how nationalists
analyze Article 1, Clause 4, of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords to suggest that peo-
ple may go to the destination of their choice, thus promoting relocation to encour-
age ethnic consolidation).
291. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (noting that many Bosnian refugees
are blocked by extremists); see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, supra note 2, at 170 (stating that as of mid-1997, 300,000 refugees and
displaced persons had returned but that Bosnia's 'divided communities' have pre-
vented many more from returning); Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bos-
nia, supra note 108 (reporting that in some areas in the Federation of Bosnia and
the Republika Srpska, return has been impossible due to factors such as harassment
and legal inequality); Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 12
(regognizing the necessity of solving the refugee issue quickly to avoid a housing
situation where the majority returns take the houses of the minority and further
segregate Bosnia).
292. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (explaining that failed refugee re-
turns could result in the resurgence of fighting); see also Cousens, supra note 2, at
201 (suggesting that the failure to facilitate refugee returns could incite conflict).
293. See supra pt. III.C (detailing the results of a prolonged refugee crisis within
Israel).
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1. Identifying the Crucial Purpose of the Dayton Accords
The parties and international community must reemphasize the
overarching purpose of the Dayton Accords, the recreation of a
multi-ethnic state.9 Recognition of this goal stresses the need for
minority returns and the prevention of forced relocation. This can be
accomplished by either supporting minority returns or preventing
forced relocation.295
a. Supporting Minority Returns
The parties must actively support minority returns. The successful
return of minorities will result in a multi-ethnic Bosnia. These mi-
nority returns can be supported through various means, including in-
ternational incentives, enhancement of the "Open City" Project, im-
provement of the infrastructure within Bosnia, and the development
of individualized city-by-city implementation forces.
The international community can encourage minority returns with
financial incentives.296 International communities can appropriate ad-
ditional resources to those cities that support and accept minority re-
turns.297 In addition, the U.N.H.C.R. could improve their "Open City"
initiative.2 " First, the U.N.H.C.R. should develop a more precise
system for selecting the cities. 99 Then it should establish a way to
294. See HOLBROOKE, supra note 17, at 232 (recognizing one of the goals of the
Dayton Accords as the creation of a multi-ethnic state).
295. See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text (noting the dangerous re-
sults of relocation including a separted Bosnia, the recognition of nationalistic
goals, and a complicated housing situation).
296. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 6 (recommend-
ing that funds be appropriated to those areas where minority returns are being fa-
cilitated); see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra
note 2, at 178 (stating the need for substantial financial aid to support refugee re-
turns).
297. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 6 (noting the
need for increased international financial involvement to support minority returns).
298. See id. (identifying the weaknesses with U.N.H.C.R.'s "Open City" initia-
tives).
299. See id. (noting that reconstruction is extremely expensive and that interna-
tional states should contribute in the reconstruction)
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confirm that the city is amenable to minority returns."' If the city has
insufficient sources, the U.N.H.C.R. could subsidize the cities' de-
velopment.30' After the city has ample sources for the return of refu-
gees, the U.N.H.C.R. could offer additional resources for their re-
turn 02 Finally, the U.N.H.C.R. should develop a group to monitor
the success and failures of the project.-
Second, the infrastructure of the cities within Bosnia must be able
to support the return of minority refugees.! Property issues must be
resolved, enabling the refugees to reacquire their land.'" This means
Bosnia must fully implement Article XI of Annex 7 concerning the
Commission's responsibilities in deciding property claims."6 In ad-
dition, Bosnia must encourage the passage of new, non-
discriminatory legislation facilitating the reacquisition of property." "
300. See OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE: SAIRAJEVO DECLARATION,
QUARTERLY IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW 3-7, available in <http://vww.ohrint:8l/
rrtf980507a.htm> [hereinafter SARAJEVO DECLARATION] (suggesting methods to
prepare and encourage refugee returns in Sarajevo, such as improving educational
and employment opportunities).
301. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
178.
302. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at 7 (identifying the
purpose of the "Open City" initiative and the recognizing the international finan-
cial support that can be received by being deemed an "Open City").
303. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 6 (noting there
is no group to monitor the process as one of the weakness of the "Open City" ini-
tiative).
304. See Sarajevo Declaration, supra note 177, at 1-10 (suggesting different
methods to facilitate the return of minority refugees including reforms with the
legislation, employment, and education).
305. See id. (claiming that the resolution of property claims is imperative for
refugee returns); RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (identifying the
resolution of the housing crisis as a necessary step for the return of refugee); Mi-
nority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 12 (identifying the need for the
expedient return of refugees to prevent a more complex, single-ethnic housing di-
lemma).
306. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. XI, 35 I.L.M. at 135
(recognizing the mandate of the Property Commission to solve property claims).
But see Scheib, supra note 4, at 125 (noting the difficulties of the Property Com-
mission in solving the claims due to the large number of claims and the limited
number of people on the Commission).
307. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at i (commending the
Federation of Bosnia's recent legislation and its expected influence on property re-
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For example, Bosnia should commend the Federation of Bosnia for
their recent adoption of new property legislation. The Bosnian
government should actively encourage the Federation of Bosnia to
administer information about the new laws through the media."°
Through this process the refugees will be able to utilize the informa-
tion, reacquire their land, and return home. 0
In addition, the foundation of the cities must be amenable for mi-
nority returns.3"' This includes the procurement of adequate housing,
employment, and education. 12 Individual cities can work with inter-
national organizations and governments to develop non-
discriminatory laws and practices for these areas."' In the employ-
ment sector, for example, international organizations could work to-
gether with the local Bosnian governments to develop an anti-
discriminatory code that could be used for hiring and the mainte-
nance of a suitable work atmosphere. In addition, in the area of edu-
acquisition).
308. See id. (noting the success of the passage of the new legislation); see also
supra notes 176-87 and accompanying text. But see NATOISFOR: Joint Press
Conference, M2 Presswire, Apr. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11305618 (stating
that although the Federation of Bosnia should be commended for their recent
adoption of property legislation, the Federation may have a difficult time with im-
plementation).
309. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at 5 (acknowledging
the need for adequate implementation of the new property legislation in the Fed-
eration of Bosnia); see also RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (ad-
dressing the need for effective implementation of the new property laws in the
Federation of Bosnia).
310. See INFORMATION NOTEs-No. 2/98, supra note 63, at 5 (explaining how
the implementation of the new property laws will allow refugees to reacquire their
land).
311. See id.
312. See Sarajevo Declaration, supra note 177, at 2-8 (identifying numerous ar-
eas which need to be addressed for the implementation of the return of refugees).
313. See RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (noting the successes
with employment, yet acknowledging the numerous problems that have arisen with
discrimination); see also Sarajevo Declaration, supra note 177, at 7 (addressing
the need to restructure the employment system within Sarajevo, thereby protecting
minorities against discrimination); James K. Boyce & Manuel Pastor, Jr., Aid for
Peace: Can International Financial Institutions Help Prevent Conflict, 15 WORLD
POL'Y J. 42, 45 (1998) (claiming that United States Assistance for International
Development ("USAID") maintains that borrowers in the private sector in Bosnia
must sign a contract agreeing not to discriminate).
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cation, the Bosnian government could develop a national curriculum
to be used by all schools. 14 This would prevent the teaching of na-
tionalistic ideas and would eliminate the propagation of ethnic ten-
sions through education.' 5
Finally, Bosnia needs to develop city-based implementation forces
to address area-specific concerns. 1' Sarajevo recently established a
commission responsible for reviewing issues related to refugee re-
turn, including employment, housing, and public security."' The
Sarajevo Return Commission will examine the successes and failures
of refugee returns in Sarajevo."' The Office of the High Representa-
tive will choose the commissioner for the Sarajevo Return Commis-
sion, in order to guarantee that a responsible, non-biased person will
be in charge." 9
The development of a return commission in Sarajevo should be
extended to the other cities throughout the Federation of Bosnia and
Republika Srpska"2 The creation of return commissions within local
314. See Sarajevo Declaration, supra note 177, at 4-5 (noting the necessity of
educating in a unprejudiced manner, and the positive effects fair education can
have on refugee return).
315. See RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (acknowledging the
harmful effects of a biased educational system, its effects on nationalism, and, in
turn, refugee returns).
316. See Boyce & Pastor, supra note 313 (identifying the need for peace-
building not only at the national level, but also regionally and locally).
317. See Sarajevo Declaration, supra note 177, at 9 (placing responsibility for
the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration on the Sarajevo return
Commission, to be established by the High Commission). A meeting held on Feb-
ruary 3, 1998, at the invitation of the chairman of the High Representative Carlos
Westendorp addressed issues relating to refugee return including education, em-
ployment, public security, and property issues. See id. at 1. Numerous key players
in the implementation of the Dayton Accords attended this conference, including
Co-Chairmen of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presidents Alija Izet-
begovic and Kresimiir Zubak, Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska, Milan Do-
dik, and Prime Minister of the Federation of Bosnia, Edhem Bicakcic. See id. at
10.
318. See id. at 3.
319. See id. at 10.
320. See supra notes 314-19 and accompanying text (detailing the creation of
the Sarajevo Return Commission and its local implementation); see also Boyd, su-
pra note 9, at 44 (noting the lack of a return commission to implement the return of
refugees).
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areas would allow for an individualized plan3'2 ' for each city, without
nationalistic influence.
3 22
b. Preventing Forced Relocation
The Bosnian society must prevent the forced relocation of refti-
gees.323 Relocation results in a partitioned Bosnia, and with this, the
possible resurgence of conflict or war.32 4 Numerous steps can be
taken to prevent forced relocation, including the denunciation of na-
tionalist leaders and the promotion of democratic leaders and meas-
ures within the entities.
Presently, nationalist leaders and hard-liners support ethnic con-
solidation through forced relocation.325 National and international
support of democratic means, however, could prevent these nation-
alistic efforts from developing and maturing.326 In effect, this support
could create a more democratic society welcoming minority re-
turns.
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321. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 2, at
175 (claiming that there is a need for individualized plans for specific areas in all
aspects of transitioning from war to peace).
322. See id. (planning the creation of the Sarajevo Return Commission, with the
chief commissioner being chosen by the High Representative).
323. See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text (examining the disastrous
consequences of forced relocation).
324. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3 (noting that
relocation accepts the position of the nationalists and creates a society filled with
ethnic tension and hate).
325. See id. (identifying the goal of nationalist hard-liners to consolidate the
ethnic groups through ethnic consolidation and forced relocation); see also supra
notes 99-116 and accompanying text (discussing the nationalists' use of relocation
to further their goal of creating ethnically homogenized areas).
326. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3 (acknowledg-
ing the necessity of the international community in altering the path of the nation-
alist leaders); see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, su-
pra note 2, at 169 (noting U.N.H.C.R.'s growing role in developing the legal and
judicial bodies within a country to promote human rights and the return of refu-
gees); Hearings, supra note 93, at I (identifying the role of the United States in the
implementation of the Dayton Accords and with this the advancement of democra-
tization).
327. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3 (recognizing
the new international role in "taking on" the nationalist leaders and the successes
achieved because of the new approach).
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The international community can assist in the democratization of
Bosnia by supporting democratic leaders.'2: This necessary interna-
tional support was recently seen in Republika Srpska with the elec-
tion of Milorad Dodik. 2 9 The international community supported
Dodik for Prime Minister."" Dodik, since taking office, has promised
to facilitate the return of refugees."' He has also pledged to assist
with the reformation of the media and the police,"" both of which
were used by nationalist hard-liners to prevent minority returns."'
In addition, Bosnian leaders must comply with Article 1, Clause 2,
Paragraph 3 of Annex 734 and reform the media to prevent propa-
ganda which suggests relocation as a preferred option.'" The leaders
328. See id. (acknowledging the international support for and subsequent elec-
tion of the Prime Minister, Milan Dodik, a more democratic leader in the Repub-
lika Srpska); cf. Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (discussing the Clinton Ad-
ministration's role in implementing the Dayton Accords). The Clinton
Administration actively supported the election of Biljana Plavsic for Bosnian Serb
President, as a replacement to the nationalist hard-liner Radovan Karadzic. See hi.
Plavsic, however, has not followed through with her promises pertaining to the
Dayton Accords. See id. The Clinton Administration must learn that support for
more democratic leaders will not serve as adequate implementation of the Dayton
Accords. See id.
329. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3 (recognizing
the new role of the international community with its active support for Milorad
Dodik); see also INFORMATION NOTEs-No. 1/98, supra note 19, at v (identifying
the international support of Milorad Dodik and his initial successes with the inter-
national communities).
330. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 3.
331. See INFORMATION NOTES-No. 1/98, supra note 19, at v (stating that,
amongst other things, Dodik promised to facilitate the return of refugees within
Republika Srpska).
332. See id. (noting Dodik's immediate pledge to reform the media and the po-
lice system).
333. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 8 (identifying
the nationalists utilization of the media and propaganda to propose relocation and
ethnic consolidation); see also supra notes 99-111. See generally Report on tile
Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108 (noting the nationalists' use of
the police and media in preventing minority returns).
334. Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 1, cl. 3, 35 I.L.M. at 137
("[T]he Parties shall take immediately the following confidence building measures:
the prevention and prompt suppression of any written or verbal incitement, through
media or otherwise, of ethnic or religious hostility or hatred.").
335. See RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (stressing the need for a
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must prohibit propaganda that intimidates people from returning to
areas where they would be minorities.3 6 The elimination of this
propaganda will allow refugees to make honest, informed decisions
about their place of return.337
Finally, Bosnia needs to ensure the adequate protection of mi-
norities within the entities. This includes fully implementing Article
II, Clause 4 of the Bosnian Constitution, which administers rights on
a non-discriminatory basis to all people, even national minorities."
The protection of minorities must extend to such factors as the rec-
ognition of the minority's culture and religious institutions. 9 Minor-
ity refugees will want to return to their original homes if their minor-
ity rights are protected and encouraged.
c. Additional Measures to Prevent Forced Relocation
Numerous other methods can be taken to prevent forced reloca-
tion. These methods include the prosecution of war criminals, 40 the
desegregation of police forces,341 and the settlement of property is-
sues.342 The implementation of these methods will create a more
neutral media, including the prevention of nationalistic ideas being propagated
through the media and the development of a nongovernmental media).
336. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108 (iden-
tifying numerous situations where nationalist individuals or leaders used propa-
ganda to intimidate minority returns).
337. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 15 (explaining
that attempts at ethnic engineering prevent refugees from making informed choices
when returning).
338. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 4, art. 11, cl. 4, 35 I.L.M. at
140.
339. See ARZT, supra note 10, at 113-16 (explaining how the protection of mi-
norities can encourage a solution to the Palestinian refugee situation).
340. See The Dayton Accords and the Return of Bosnian Refugees, supra note 7,
at 14 (stating that the prosecution of war criminals is necessary to dissipate fear
within a community and secure an atmosphere suitable for return); see also Dayton
at Two Years, supra note 9, at 3-5 (claiming that the capture of war criminals,
Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, could result in not only the capture of other
war criminals but also in progress with the facilitation of the return of refugees).
341. See Minority Return or Mass Relocation, supra note 64, at 6 (recognizing
the need for minority officers in police forces).
342. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (describing the complexi-
ties that can arise with housing if there is fixed relocation).
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amenable atmosphere for minority refugee returns.' Refugees will
be more comfortable in choosing to return to areas where they would
be of the ethnic minority.2
B. DEVELOPING A PLAN FOR RETURN: CHANGES TO
ANNEX 7?
The lack of a comprehensive plan between the Palestinian and Is-
raeli parties resulted in failed refugee returns.4' Bosnia must prevent
this same transpiration from occurring by developing a specific,
comprehensive plan. 6 Annex 7 serves as a foundation for return. '
This plan, however, has many problems that could result in its failed
implementation.34"
Annex 7 currently provides no implementation force to facilitate
the return of refugees."' The necessity of this force is seen in failed
minority returns throughout cities in the Federation of Bosnia and the
Republika Srpska.'5 ' The utilization of NATO forces could greatly
343. See RRTF: Report for March 1998, supra note 25 (noting that certain con-
ditions must be met to facilitate the return of refugees, especially minority refu-
gees).
344. See id.
345. See Weiner, supra note 81, at 41-43 (noting the flaws with the U.N. resolu-
tions granting the right of return for the Palestinian refugees): see also supra notes
277-88 and accompanying text.
346. See Cousens, supra note 2, at 789 (stating that the General Framework
Agreement (Dayton Accords) is more "general" than a "framework"); see also
Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (noting the inconsistencies with the Dayton
Accords, specifically in relation to the return of refugees).
347. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15. Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 13741.
348. See supra notes 98-152 and accompanying text (desciribing the numerous
flaws with Annex 7 including its acceptance of relocation as an option, lack of
military presence, lack of a specific timeline. too much power in the parties' hands,
and a contradiction which could result in a partitioned Bosnia).
349. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 137-4 1.
350. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Bosnia, supra note 108 (de-
tailing numerous stories where individuals, police forces, or local governments
prevented minority returns through violent means). But see Scheib, supra note 4, at
130-132 (observing that the two possible forces in Bosnia, the newly organized ex-
ecutive government and the local police, do not seem to be effective due to the po-
litical situation in Bosnia)
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expedite the return process.3 5' NATO would provide military support
and the necessary protection to ensure retum.35
Bosnia must also create a safe, secure atmosphere for refugee re-
turns, thus implementing the factors specified in Article II of Annex
7.353 The creation of suitable conditions for returns depends in large
part on the creation of an implementation force to oversee the proc-
ess;"4 the influence of the Bosnian and international communities in
building the infrastructure of Bosnia;355 and the prevention of nation-
alistic propaganda.3 56
Finally, Bosnia must concentrate on the future in order to success-
fully reach their goals of returning refugees and recreating a multi-
ethnic Bosnia. 5 7 No one is able to nor should forget the past, but both
the Bosnian people and leaders must realize that the return of refu-
gees and the attainment of peace depend on looking forward. " ' Bos-
351. See Dayton at Two Years, supra note 9 (suggesting that policy-makers
should not distinguish civilian matters from military ones and arguing that NATO
should help secure the situation and help facilitate the return of refugees).
352. See id. (identifying the need for NATO for the facilitation of refugee re-
turn).
353. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 7, art. 2, cl. 1, 35 I.L.M. at
138 ("The Parties undertake to create in their territories the political, economic,
and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegra-
tion of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for any particular
group.").
354. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text (identifying the necessity of
a military force to create conditions amenable for return and to provide a sense of
security for the refugees while returning).
355. See supra notes 304-15 and accompanying text (describing how the infra-
structure with in Bosnia must be suitable for refugee returns including solving
property issues, the increse in employment opportunities and the prevention of dis-
crimination in both the schools and workplace).
356. See supra notes 325-41 and accompanying text (noting the presence of na-
tionalistic propaganda and the need to replace such propaganda with more demo-
cratic means).
357. See ARZT, supra note 10, at 7-8 (noting the necessity of looking forward
with the Palestinian refugee situation, and not concentrating on the past causes of
dislocation).
358. See id. (suggesting that the parties in the Palestinian refugee situation must
"move on").
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nia must listen to the advice of Shimon Peres and "divorce [itself]
from the world of yesterday, and recognize the world of today.""'
CONCLUSION
The republic of Bosnia, during the Yugoslavian years, was distin-
guished for its diversity and heterogeneous atmosphere.' Muslims,
Serbs, Croats, and Jews lived and worked together. The Bosnians
took pride in their regional capital, Sarajevo, in which a Serbian
church, Catholic church, Muslim mosque, and Jewish synagogue
were located in close proximity to one another. The Bosnians have
not forgotten the days of living in a multi-ethnic state. The facilita-
tion of the return of refugees is imperative to reach this goal and
maintain peace in the country. Although Annex 7 offers a definite
foundation, the international and domestic communities must work
together to enforce its provisions and ensure expedient, safe returns.
359. See Jerusalem Will Not Become Another Berlin, JERUSALEM POST. July 1,
1994, at 1.
360. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (explaining the prewar
population within Bosnia was 43.7% Muslim, 31.4% Serb, 17.3% Croat, and 5.5%
Yugoslav and therefore was the most ethnically mixed of any of the republics
within Yugoslavia).
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